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Brescia: Creative Lawyering for Social Change

CREATIVE LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
Raymond H. Brescia*
Lawyers have long played an integral part in efforts to bring about
social change. With an increasing desire to see change in the world,
regardless of one’s political perspective, there is a growing interest in
understanding the role that lawyers can play in bringing about such
change. This type of lawyering is complex, however, and faces far
more challenges than those the traditional lawyer faces in his or her
work. Although all lawyers solve problems on behalf of their clients,
the role of the social-change lawyer is more complex because the
problems she seeks to address are more complex, mostly because she
is not trying to operate within the existing legal system on behalf of
her client but, rather, trying to change it. Indeed, the social-change
lawyer often faces complex problems that require complex and
creative solutions. This article explores the nature of the creativity
required of the social-change lawyer by an assessment of three
campaigns for social change in which lawyers played prominent
roles: the effort to abolish slavery, the campaign to end Jim Crow
segregation, and the movement for marriage equality. This review
unearths several common components of these campaigns. For
example, they typically sought incremental change, used
interpretative tools that helped reframe the issues affecting their
clients, brought in interdisciplinary perspectives, sought to build
coalitions based on areas where the interests of different communities
might converge, and were conscious of trends and forces occurring
outside the law that were likely to affect the legal campaigns. It is
through an assessment of these successful efforts and an
*
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May 26, 2018, entitled “Why the World Needs More Lawyers (At Least the Creative Kind).” I wish to
thank my colleagues, Andrew Ayers, Edward W. DeBabieri, and Sarah Rogerson, for helpful comments
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identification of the common characteristics of such creative problem
solving for social change that I hope will serve as inspiration for
those working for positive social change, today and in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Whether evidenced by the election of Donald J. Trump to the
United States presidency, the Brexit vote in Great Britain, the
Women’s Marches, or the advocacy for stricter gun laws in the wake
of the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, there appears to be a
clamoring, on the right and the left, for social change.1 Many of these
efforts are organized at the grassroots level organically, and some are
orchestrated by wealthy donors.2 Whether organic or orchestrated,
many participating in such efforts are dissatisfied with the status quo
and seek social change regardless of their political perspective.3
When people seek social change, they often see a problem before
them that they want solved, whether it is to end gender-based,
workplace harassment and sexual violence4 or to relieve corporations
of what are perceived as burdensome, “job-killing” regulations.5 In
1. Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic HaveNots and Cultural Backlash 9–10 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series,
Paper No. RWP16-026, Aug. 2016) (describing and explaining rise of conservative populism); Michelle
Cottle, How Parkland Students Changed the Gun Debate, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/parkland-students-power/554399/
[https://perma.cc/QQ44-9EZL] (describing the role of students in gun control advocacy).
2. Eliza Newlin Carney, Who’s Behind the Women’s March?, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://prospect.org/article/who%E2%80%99s-behind-women%E2%80%99s-march
[https://perma.cc/PL8D-QZAR] (describing grassroots organizing behind the Women’s March). See
generally JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE
OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016) (describing funding of conservative groups).
3. See THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF
REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 25–28 (2016); revg33k, Forum Post: First Official Release from Occupy
Wall Street, (Sept. 30, 2011), http://occupywallst.org/forum/first-official-release-from-occupy-wallstreet/ [https://perma.cc/3PB3-PWWJ] (describing “grievances” that motivated actions of the Occupy
Wall Street movement).
4. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 590 (1986) (describing the role of rights claims on behalf
of women to advance social change).
5. Elizabeth Kolbert, The E.P.A.’s Dangerous Anti-Regulatory Policies, NEW YORKER (June 30,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-epas-dangerous-anti-regulatory-policies
[https://perma.cc/ZZ76-PZSB] (describing the formation of a task force within the Trump
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what Gillian Hadfield calls a “law-thick world,”6 the solutions to
address problems like these often involve some change to the legal
infrastructure that addresses the social issue that advocates seek to
affect when they pursue social change.7 And, to effect this social
change, creativity in finding solutions is often a critical feature of any
effort to change that legal or regulatory infrastructure. In addition to
the conscious efforts of individuals, groups, and corporations to
effectuate social change through legal and policy advocacy,
campaign donations, and community mobilization, social change is
also happening whether or not it is driven by forces that may have
humans at the center of the change, like commercial ventures that
produce technological change,8 or occurs despite the best efforts by
some to curtail them, like climate change as a product of human
activity that sets natural forces and responses in motion.9 Whether
humans cause these problems directly—and intentionally—or only
indirectly—and unintentionally—human agency is central to address
the range of problems the world presently faces.10 Given the
complexity of these problems, creativity is needed to craft
solutions.11 What is more, the curation of legal, policy, and

Administration to eliminate “job-killing regulations”).
6. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the
(Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 43 (2014).
7. For a description of several campaigns to bring about social change by efforts to change the legal
infrastructure in several different legal and policy contexts, see generally DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF
LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (describing
efforts to promote marriage equality, Second Amendment rights, and to protect the rights of detainees
held as a result of the law enforcement effort called the War on Terror).
8. See generally KEVIN KELLY, THE INEVITABLE: UNDERSTANDING THE 12 TECHNOLOGICAL
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE (2016) (describing technological changes that are affecting
and will affect the future of the human race).
9. On the impact of human behavior and technological change on the environment and climate, see
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 92–110 (2014).
10. Erle C. Ellis, Science Alone Won’t Save the Earth. People Have to Do That., N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/opinion/sunday/science-people-environmentearth.html [https://perma.cc/K4UZ-EUAV] (arguing that human action is essential to address some of
the world’s problems like climate change, overpopulation, and reduction in biodiversity).
11. Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175, 184 (1996). As Philip Schrag
argues, “One of the hallmarks of an effective lawyer is that he or she can (1) recognize those occasions
when doing a task by the book is not likely to achieve satisfactory results, (2) figure out a creative
alternative, and (3) find the courage to deviate from the accepted norm of practice.” Id.
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regulatory solutions to these problems will likely be at the center of
efforts to address these problems, whether solutions involve building
up and increasing or taking away and reducing the size and scope of
the legal, policy, and regulatory infrastructure that addresses these
problems. If creative problem solving is a necessary element of social
change now and in the future, and a core element of this problem
solving will require legal, policy, and regulatory responses to these
problems, lawyers will be at the center of social change for the
foreseeable future.12 Given the complexity of the problems and the
need for creative solutions to address them, it will not be just any
lawyers at the center of this change but rather creative ones. If this is
the case, can we identify the elements of creative lawyering for social
change so that we might understand what it will take to prepare and
train lawyers to assume their proper role in efforts to bring about this
change? This article attempts to identify these elements by a review
of three moments in American social and political history when
lawyers played a critical role in crafting creative solutions to thorny
social problems.
The lawyers I highlight in this review include several lawyers
involved in the effort to end slavery in the United States, those
engaged in the legal fight to dismantle the Jim Crow system in the
South in the mid-twentieth century, and lawyers committed to the
recent effort to bring about marriage equality for the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) community. Although the
lawyers in these moments were not the sole actors in the
social-change effort that unfolded in these particular points in history
or even the main drivers of the campaign to end slavery, in all three
examples, the lawyers I highlight played key roles in helping to craft
not just our understanding of these problems but also creative
responses to them.13 In at least the last two examples, the creative
12. GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED LAW AND HOW TO
REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2017). To turn to Gillian Hadfield again, “[A]ny
solutions we think we are developing toward clean energy, reduced poverty, or safer disease-free
communities depend on developing better legal infrastructure.” Id.
13. See infra Part II.
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lawyers I highlight helped to lead the legal struggle to reconstruct an
edifice of inclusion and equality and solve dramatic legal inequalities
with an ultimate goal of rectifying broader societal inequalities. The
hope is that this review can help unearth lessons from past instances
when lawyers used creativity to advance social change, particularly
social change that had a legal component at its center, to help inform
efforts in the present and future to effect similar social change.
With these goals in mind, this article proceeds as follows. Part I
reviews the literature on creativity in the law to show that, contrary to
popular perception, there can be creativity to the lawyer’s craft
generally, and Part I reviews the techniques that lawyers often use
when they seek to address their clients’ problems creatively. Part I
also explores the ways in which social-change lawyering is different
from, and can often be more complex than, more traditional
lawyering.
Part II explores three examples of instances where lawyers played
a significant role in helping advance social change. The hope is that
this exploration will help unearth common themes regarding the
approaches these lawyers appear to have taken in advancing social
change, creatively and intentionally. These three examples involve
the effort to end slavery in the United States, the campaign to
dismantle Jim Crow, and the effort for recognition of same-sex
marriage. These three examples offer critical lessons about what
creative lawyering for social change entails.
Part III identifies what I consider to be the five common
components of these campaigns for social change. This review
suggests that these components include, first, that the lawyers have
often proceeded incrementally and in an iterative, experimental
fashion. They have looked for ways to build support for their legal
position both in the courts of law and in public opinion, seeking a
tipping point where the solutions they propose gain and secure
traction and ultimately create a new legal paradigm around the
problem.14 Second, creative lawyers advocating for social change
14. On the concept of tipping points in constitutional adjudication, see Suzanne B. Goldberg,
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have typically viewed the legal problem that presented itself in a way
that others had not viewed it, often taking the arguments of their
adversaries, co-opting them, turning them on their heads, reframing
them, and shifting them to the lawyers’ advantage.15 Third, creative
lawyers are humble enough to incorporate the viewpoints and
approaches of other disciplines, bringing different domains into the
advocacy effort to strengthen their legal arguments.16 Fourth, lawyers
often seek out, both consciously and unconsciously, what the late
Derrick Bell called “Interest Convergence”: opportunities for
different sectors in society to share a common goal based on their
similar, though often different, particular interests.17 Fifth, creative
lawyers for social change often recognize that their advocacy does
not appear in a vacuum; it is dependent on and occurs simultaneously
with changes occurring in broader society.18 In these ways, socialchange lawyering is interdependent with larger social forces, and the
creative lawyer must take these social forces into account when she
engages in efforts to bring about social change.
The final section, Part IV explores the implications of this
taxonomy of creative social-change lawyering and charts a path
forward for those who might want to bring creativity to this
endeavor, either because they are currently lawyers advocating for
social change, current law students or law faculty, or even those who
are simply contemplating going to law school. This article tries to
spark a discussion about the proper role of creativity in lawyering at
this time of great social ferment when many seek to advance social

Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1955, 1974–75 (2006).
15. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–35 (1950) (discussion of litigation strategy of the
NAACP LDF, where the lawyers argued not only that “separate but equal” was unconstitutional but also
that the alternative law school for African-American students set up by the University of Texas may
have been separate but was not equal); see infra text accompanying notes 152–169.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 170–184 (describing marriage equality litigation that included
testimony from experts from fields other than law).
17. See infra Part III.D and citations contained therein.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 145–49 (describing President Lincoln’s decision to withhold
the release of the Emancipation Proclamation until there was a Union victory on the field of battle).
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change and alter the legal landscape to address what they see as
societal ills.
I. Creative Problem Solving and the Law
A. Lawyering as Creative Problem Solving
The world’s natural resources are under threat, and the ability to
feed a growing global population faces serious challenges due to the
specter of drought, the inundation of farmlands, the erosion of top
soil, and other problems caused by climate change.19 Armed conflict
in the Middle East and Africa,20 political unrest in South America,21
and criminal terror in Central America have created a global refugee
crisis.22 The rise of authoritarianism and a hard-edged form of
conservative populism threaten the rule of law.23 A threat to the rule
of law, in turn, is a challenge for economic growth, as fairness,
consistency, and predictability in governance is directly correlated
19. KOLBERT, supra note 9, at 92–110 (describing the impact of human behavior and technological
change on the environment and climate); Marshall Burke & David Lobell, Climate Effects on Food
Security, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOOD SECURITY: ADAPTING AGRICULTURE TO A WARMER WORLD
13, 18–21 (Marshall Burke & David Lobell eds., 2010) (describing risks to food supply from climate
change).
20. See Mark Lynch & Laurie Brand, Refugees and Displacement in the Middle East, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 29, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/29/refugeesand-displacement-in-middle-east-pub-68479 [https://perma.cc/D439-PUZ2] (explaining that the wars in
Syria and Iraq have yielded “the greatest share of the Middle East’s refugees in recent years” and that
“North African states . . . have emerged as key transit hubs for refugee flows into Europe).
21. See Lucia Newman, Nicaragua Unrest: New Refugee Crisis Unfolding in Latin America, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/nicaragua-unrest-refugee-crisisunfolding-latin-america-180805095729411.html [https://perma.cc/VN9Y-KN4F] (reporting that 23,000
Nicaraguans have applied for asylum in Costa Rica to escape persecution in Nicaragua).
22. See Maya Averbuch, The Neverending Cycles of Central American Refugees, MEDIUM (Aug. 29,
2018),
https://medium.com/s/greatescape/the-neverending-cycles-of-central-american-refugees5f740f01bbe5 [https://perma.cc/E67P-S3YD] (explaining that many Central Americans flee to escape
the criminal violence of gangs such as MS-13).
23. For a description of the components of the notion of the rule of law, see PAUL GOWDER, THE
RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 7 (2016). The recent confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which raises questions about judicial independence and impartiality (two critical
components of the rule of law), has been described as a threat to the rule of law. Roger Cohen, Opinion,
An Insidious and Contagious American Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/trump-kavanaugh-confirmation-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/44JN-CD5C].
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with the economic health of a nation, as well as its long-term
survival.24 Rapid technological change, which is a product of
compounding technological innovation, is already remaking society
and is likely to have dramatic effects on social and economic
relations for generations.25 Whether it is autonomous vehicles, the
Internet of Things, or Big Data and artificial intelligence, the rapid
increase in computing power that has been unleashed could address
some of the world’s problems, like pedestrian, passenger, and driver
deaths from automobiles,26 but has also created new problems, like
privacy breaches, cybersecurity, and threats of a drone or unmanned
vehicle delivering a dirty bomb or, worse, a nuclear payload from a
remote location on the other side of the planet.27 Rapid technological
change has also remade the economic landscape and stands to alter
the relationship of many workers to their employers, a shift we are
already seeing in the sharing economy.28 Whether it is complete
displacement from automation or a shift from regular employment to
sporadic, contract, “on demand” work, the relationship of many of
the world’s workers, in diverse fields such as truck transport,
manufacturing, and even the law, are likely to see dramatic changes
to the ways in which they relate to their employers and earn a living
over the coming decades.29 Furthermore, as the evidence of the use of
24. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 428–37 (2012).
25. STEVE CASE, THE THIRD WAVE: AN ENTREPRENEUR’S VISION OF THE FUTURE 185–200 (2016)
(assessing the potential impact of technological change on economic development and economic
opportunity); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO
THRIVING IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 19–184 (2016) (describing the forces of computing power,
the Internet, globalization, and climate change and their impact on the future).
26. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS,
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 190–202 (2014) (discussing the superiority
of human intelligence and abilities compared to machine learning and artificial intelligence).
27. See BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS AND GERMS,
HACKERS AND DRONES: CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT 1–10 (2015) (discussing the threats
posed by new technologies for global security).
28. See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 26, at 204–45 (describing short- and long-term
solutions for dealing with the technological change the authors predict for the immediate future).
29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 203–43 (identifying strategies for dealing with the impact of
technology on employment); KELLY, supra note 8, at 29–60 (assessing the role of machine learning and
artificial intelligence on employment opportunities in a range of industries); ALEC ROSS, THE
INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 35–42 (2016) (discussing the role of automation and artificial intelligence
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modern technologies like the Internet and social media to undermine
elections in several democratic nations is overwhelming, it is
apparent that sometimes the forces described abovelike
authoritarianism, technological change, and threats to the rule of
lawcompound each other. In this way, technological advances can
support efforts to undermine the rule of law, exacerbating the threats
to stability and democracy.30 Similarly, technological change is
having a dramatic impact on economic well-being across the world,
creating vast wealth for a few people and increasing inequality in
some nations.31 These problems are all crying out for a solution, and
lawyers are in the problem-solving business.
For Gerald Lopez, “Lawyering means problem-solving.”32
Similarly, for Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a lawyer is a “professional
with formal legal training who employs law, as well as other relevant
disciplines, to solve human problems and disputes, plan transactions,
[and] prepare legal instruments and regulations . . . .”33 Lawyers
on employment prospects of various industries); RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE
PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 45–99
(2015) (discussing the role of technology on various professions, including the legal profession). For an
assessment of the impact of these forces on the legal profession, see, for example, BENJAMIN H.
BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 191–214 (2015)
(discussing the role of technology in improving access to justice); DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE
WITH LAWYERS 9–10 (2015) (describing the “drivers of change” in the legal profession, including new
technologies); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 98–141 (2010) (describing technologies that threaten to “disrupt” the legal profession).
30. See, e.g., Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fixfacebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/M6JH-NHR8]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti,
The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trumpclinton.html [https://perma.cc/2GED-X8JM] (describing efforts of the government of the Russian
Federation and private Russian forces to undermine the 2016 election in the United States);.
31. All of these forces also have a potential impact on economic inequality. See, e.g., JAMES
BESSEN, LEARNING BY DOING: THE REAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INNOVATION, WAGES, AND WEALTH
222–28 (2015) (discussing the role of social mobility and social role flexibility in labor’s adaptation to
technological change as a way to address economic inequality brought about by technological change);
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 304–06 (2014) (discussing the interplay of
technology, education, and inequality); DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, THROWING ROCKS AT THE GOOGLE BUS:
HOW GROWTH BECAME THE ENEMY OF PROSPERITY 222–39 (2016) (describing ways technology can
help combat economic inequality and foster sustainable prosperity).
32. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
33. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Symposium, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral:
OF THE
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often find themselves in the “problem space,” where they must either
find solutions or make situations more complex to advance a client’s
interest.34 According to Gary Blasi: “At bottom, lawyering entails
solving (or making worse) problems of clients and others, under
conditions of extraordinary complexity and uncertainty, in a virtually
infinite range of settings.”35 The American Bar Association describes
problem solving and legal analysis as the two “conceptual
foundations for virtually all aspects of legal practice . . . .”36 But
lawyers do more than bring mere technical skill to this problem
space. As Paul Brest argues, a lawyer must certainly use her legal
training and judgment to address a client’s problem; she must also
understand the other constraints—like the political setting or the
economic capacity with which a client operates—that bind the
client’s actions.37 Indeed, as he and Linda Hamilton Krieger explain:
“[F]inding the best solution—a solution that addresses all of the
client’s concerns—usually requires more than technical legal skill.”38
Lawyers thus solve client problems that have a legal component to
them, taking into account a range of interests and needs in the pursuit
of solutions that address those needs.39
But what role does creativity play in lawyering and problem
solving? According to Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck,
creativity is one of the core lawyering skills that they have identified
as essential to contemporary law practice.40 Legal problem solving
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793–94 (1999).
34. Sometimes, lawyers, particularly social-change lawyers, make problems worse for their
adversaries in order to gain leverage against their clients’ opponents. See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What
Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 331 (1995) (describing how lawyers can solve problems or make them worse).
35. Id. at 317.
36. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 135 (1992) [hereinafter NARROWING THE GAP].
37. See Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and
Problem Solvers, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 8 (1995).
38. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Symposium, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 811, 811 (1999).
39. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 37, at 8.
40. See MARJORIE M. SHULTZ & SHELDON ZEDECK, IDENTIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND
VALIDATION OF PREDICTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL LAWYERING 24–26 (2008).
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tends to require some degree of creativity, regardless of the nature of
the work involved.41 When engaging in creative problem solving,
Menkel-Meadow argues that the lawyer uses analogy and metaphor,
draws lessons and insights from other fields, “extend[s] a line of
reasoning, principle or solution beyond its original purpose,”
challenges conventional assumptions, deploys narrative, and reframes
problems by looking at them from different perspectives.42 Another
way to think about these approaches is that they represent what is
sometimes called “lateral thinking”: moving beyond purely linear,
analytical thought and shifting mental paradigms.43 Similar to
Menkel-Meadow, Linda Morton has identified the characteristics of
creative problem solving in the law as including a focus on the
“underlying needs and interests . . . of individuals as well as society,”
an analysis of the values at stake in a situation, including those of an
individual but also society as a whole, the use of interdisciplinary
resources, a focus on problem prevention, and “self-reflection and
analysis.”44
B. Problem Solving and Social-Change Lawyering
Although the problem-solving work of a lawyer often involves
creativity, particularly when she is asked to solve complex problems,
the lawyer who works for social change—however she defines that
change—faces unique challenges that add another layer, or layers, of
complexity to the lawyer’s work and the choices she must make.45
41. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 102–03 (2001). As Menkel-Meadow
points out: “The creative legal problem solver . . . must learn to navigate within the seas of optimistic
creativity, the swells of dynamic interaction with others (client and other counsel and parties) and the
oceans of realistic legal possibility.” Id. at 103.
42. Id. at 122–25; see also BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY
INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 135–37, 142–44 (2003) (exploring strategies for
creative problem solving).
43. See EDWARD DE BONO, SERIOUS CREATIVITY: USING THE POWER OF LATERAL THINKING TO
CREATE NEW IDEAS 15, 51–56 (1992).
44. Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 375, 378 (1998).
45. See William P. Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC.
JUST. 7, 10 (2007) (“Those who practice social justice law are essentially swimming upstream while
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Social-change lawyers certainly must bring creativity to their work to
solve the complex problems that they are often asked to solve, or
have taken upon themselves to solve, but the role they assume when
seeking to address social problems takes on new dimensions beyond
those that traditional lawyers must address.
1. Social-Change Lawyers Work to Change the System
The most important difference between a social-change lawyer and
a traditional lawyer is that the social-change lawyer is generally
working to change the legal infrastructure affecting her client’s life.46
The traditional lawyer, by contrast, generally works within that
infrastructure.47 Certainly, there are situations where a traditional
lawyer might argue for a novel or creative take on a particular
precedent to gain an advantage for a specific client, but the socialchange lawyer generally works for broader, societal change, and the
novel or creative arguments about precedent can, at times, have
tremendous impact on not just her client but society more broadly.
The lawyers who argued Obergefell v. Hodges48 were claiming
recognition of their clients’ marital relationships. A traditional lawyer
might do that when seeking recognition of spousal support on behalf
of a client. But the arguments the traditional lawyer might make are
likely asking for recognition for the client within existing definitions
of marital relations. The marriage-equality lawyers were arguing,
similarly, for recognition of LGBTQ relationships using existing
legal frameworks; in fact, that was the point of the marriage-equality
effort.49 But, what that required was a new understanding of not just
others are on their way down.”).
46. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, n.2 (1996) (describing social-change lawyering).
47. Even Alexis de Tocqueville, in his visits to early 19th century America, recognized the “general
spirit” of the legal profession at the time as “eminently conservative and anti-democratic.” ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Knopf 3d ed.
1946) (1835).
48. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
49. NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE EQUALITY
TO AMERICA 7–8 (2017) (describing marriage equality movement’s demands); see also Molly Ball, The
Marriage Plot: Inside This Year’s Epic Campaign for Gay Equality, ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2012),
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marital relations but also the Equal Protection Clause itself.50 This is
just one example of a situation in which the social-change lawyer is
often arguing not inside the system but seeking to change the system
itself, making her job much more complicated and challenging than
that of the traditional lawyer in many instances.51
2. Social-Change Lawyers Must Strive to Empower Their
Clients and Not Further Marginalize Them.
Not only must social-change lawyers work to improve the lives of
their clients and the communities in which they live, they must also
strive to ensure that they are placing the clients out in front of the
advocacy, thereby empowering them.52 The wave of legal advocates
that emerged in the wake of the successes of the Civil Rights
Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the work they
shouldered on behalf of marginalized groups generated critiques of
lawyer-driven advocacy.53 Some raised concerns that lawyer-driven
advocacyoften focused on lawyer-centric strategies like
litigationran the risk of disempowering grassroots groups and
detracting from efforts to build grassroots campaigns and, ultimately,
grassroots power.54 Moreover, some critics argued that these lawyer-

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/the-marriage-plot-inside-this-years-epic-campaignfor-gay-equality/265865/ [https://perma.cc/C8UQ-U67D].
50. FRANK, supra note 49, at 353 (describing marriage equality advocates’ equal protection
arguments).
51. Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REV. 171, 176–82 (1993) (describing the
types of changes the social-change lawyer pursues).
52. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructing Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,
100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2123–30 (1991) (describing the importance of client empowerment in socialchange advocacy).
53. The scholarship critiquing lawyer-driven advocacy is vast. See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Richard L.
Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 L. & POL’Y 5, 6 (1985); Binny Miller, Give Them Back
Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 524–32 (1994)
(arguing for the centrality of client voice in case development); Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1,
5, 45–46 (1990).
54. Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV.
805, 806 (2008) (arguing that effective social-change efforts require coalition building).
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driven strategies, on their own, fail to lead to lasting change.55
Lasting change is difficult to achieve when efforts to promote social
change do not fundamentally attack and alter existing power
relations.56 Making matters worse, there is a threat that advocacy that
places the lawyer at the center of the work can even further
marginalize clients, typically by casting and treating the clients as
victims rather than recognizing the potential of their own power as
individuals and groups of individuals to pursue and obtain selfdetermination, autonomy, and power.57 Thus, social-change lawyers
should strive to put their client at the center of their work so as not to
further marginalize them. Society does that enough. The traditional
lawyer likely does not face similar challenges.

55. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND
LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION 1 (1994); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY:
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 107–08 (1986); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 12 (2d ed. 2008); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE xvii–xxv
(1974); Abel, supra note 53, at 8; Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 620–21, 661 (1992);
Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 (1970).
56. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 688–89 (1987); Steve Bachmann, Lawyers,
Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 31–33 (1985).
57. For the critique of lawyer-centric, social-change advocacy, see LÓPEZ, supra note 53, at 39;
Alfieri, supra note 52, at 2110–11; White, supra note 53, at 20–21. For the argument that clientempowerment strategies face their own limitations when these strategies must still take into account the
social structures, and the limitations of those structures, within which clients find themselves, see Frank
Munger, Rights in the Shadow of Class: Poverty, Welfare, and the Law, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 330, 336–37 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Gary L. Blasi, Symposium,
What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063,
1092 (1994); William H. Simon, Symposium, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1101–
02 (1994). As I have argued elsewhere:
Conscientious and committed progressive lawyers now struggle with these challenges:
How to ensure that legal advocacy is meaningful to the lives of clients; that it is grounded
in broader movements for political change; that it combines a range of tactics—direct
services, mass mobilization, community education and law reform; that it is responsive to
the day-to-day needs of the communities those lawyers serve; and that it takes into account
the political realities in such a way that a legal victory in one arena will not be snuffed out
by a political loss in another.
Raymond H. Brescia, Line in the Sand: Progressive Lawyering, “Master Communities,” and a Battle
for Affordable Housing in New York City, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 715, 727 (2010).
THE
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3. Social-Change Lawyers Have Different Constraints in Case
Selection
There is also a unique financial component to the lawyer–client
relationship that exists between the social-change lawyer and her
clients when compared to that typically involved in the traditional
lawyer–client relationship.58 This different relationship can have
ramifications for the actions the lawyer takes, or does not take, on
behalf of her client. In the typical lawyer–client relationship in the
contemporary legal profession, the lawyer is paid on a fee-for-service
basis, often at an hourly rate, and sometimes based on a flat fee
depending on the service she provides.59 Sometimes a lawyer
proceeds on a contingency-fee basis, where she bears the risk of an
unsuccessful outcome and only receives compensation if she is
successful on behalf of her client.60 Each of these relationships
hinges on the economic relationship between the lawyer and the
client; the client often makes decisions based on an economic
calculus of whether it is worth it to proceed with the representation
58. Thelton Henderson, Social Change, Judicial Activism, and the Public Lawyer, 12 WASH U. J.L.
& POL’Y 33, 33–34 (2003).
Traditional law firms will take your newly-minted diploma and your ability to think like a
lawyer, . . . and they will train and mentor you. . . . The client will usually pay for at least a
part, if not most, of that training through something with which we’re all familiar: the
billable hour.
If, however, you want to work for a legal aid office, or some other nonprofit public interest
group that has scant resources, you might well receive a stack of files and find out that you
are on your own to learn lawyering as you go, perhaps even by trial-and-error. There is
virtually no budget in most of these operations for training new attorneys, and, of course,
the billable hour is not applicable in this setting.
Id.
59. John M. A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and Money, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 95, 105–28
(1995) (describing contours of traditional lawyer-client retainer agreements).
60. See When You Need a Lawyer—Legal Fees and Expenses, AM. B. ASS’N (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consumers/lawyerfees
_contingent.html [https://perma.cc/LT97-RAKC]. The American Bar Association explains contingency
fees as follows:
In a contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer agrees to accept a fixed percentage (often
one[-]third) of the recovery, which is the amount finally paid to the client. If you win the
case, the lawyer’s fee comes out of the money awarded to you. If you lose, neither you nor
the lawyer will get any money, but you will not be required to pay your attorney for the
work done on the case.
Id.
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based on—to put it crudely—how much justice she can afford.61
Thus, critical tactical decisions may come down to whether the client
wishes to pay for the service offered by the lawyer.62 A client may
wish to spare no expense and give the lawyer great freedom to make
tactical decisions, regardless of the cost.63 The client may choose
certain tactics based solely on a cost-benefit calculus of the likely
gains possible through the use of different tactics and the potential
outcomes and risks associated with those tactics.64 Of course, though
cost may impact the tactical choices a lawyer might make on behalf
of a client, with the decisions about those choices made with the
client’s cost consciousness in mind, it is also entirely possible that the
lawyer and client may have no tactical choices to make because the
client foregoes legal representation altogether based on the perceived
costs associated with that representation and the likely benefits that
might accrue, or, more simply, because she cannot afford any level of
service from the lawyer.65 Indeed, many Americans face their legal
problems without a lawyer, with cost being one of the main
contributing factors to their decision to proceed or not to proceed
with representation.66 In many ways, this is a relatively easy decision.
The client consults with the lawyer, makes a decision on the likely
61. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 244–45 (2006)
(describing cartoon that originally ran in the New Yorker in which a lawyer asks his client, “You’ve got
a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can you afford?”).
62. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1789–90 (2001)
(explaining that defendants who hire their own counsel are often no better off than if they had been
represented by a public defender because those individuals are typically only slightly better off than the
indigent).
63. John T. Woodall, Commonsense Principles of Civil Litigation, 52 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 38
(1994) (describing lawyer-client decision-making around expenses in litigation).
64. Robert P. Burns & Steven Lubet, Division of Authority Between Attorney and Client: The Case
of the Benevolent Otolaryngologist, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1294–96 (2003) (discussing the poorly
defined boundaries between ends and means). For the tension in civil rights litigation when representing
groups of clients in navigating these poorly defined boundaries, see generally William B. Rubenstein,
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights
Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997).
65. On the deliberations around ends and means between the lawyer and her client, see, for example
ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 132–34 (1995).
66. On the reasons why Americans often forego legal representation, with cost being just one such
reason, see REBECCA SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS FROM
THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 12–13 (2014).
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costs and potential benefits of representation, and decides how she
would like the lawyer to proceed.67
In the social-change context, the calculus is often much different.
There is certainly some small degree of overlap in the approaches
used by some social-change lawyers and those used in traditional
settings. With certain social-change-oriented fields of practicelike
employment discrimination, employee wage-and-hour rights, police
brutality actions, and social security benefitssocial-change lawyers
may operate from within the private bar, charging contingency fees
for their work and taking a portion of the award they may win on
behalf of their clients or earning remuneration through fee-shifting
provisions in the statutes governing the claims.68 At the same time,
the possibility of contingency-fee arrangements often crowds out the
work of the social-change lawyer, who might make strategic
decisions about the types of cases she tends to take based on whether
a particular client might have other options for representation based
on the availability of lawyers from the private bar willing to take the
client’s case through a contingency-fee-based retainer.69
But in other fieldswhere there are few contingency-fee
opportunities, where the private bar might see the client’s claim as
too risky to take (even on contingency), or where fee-shifting might
not be availablethe social-change lawyer will typically work in a
67. On some of the elements of the decision to accept a client for representation in the traditional
lawyer-client setting, see generally W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in
Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987 (2006).
68. On the role of fee-shifting statutes in civil rights litigation, see, for example, Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980). For a description of recent developments in the jurisprudence around feeshifting in civil rights cases, see generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural
Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007).
69. In addition to the desire to serve only the client who may not have private options available to
her for representation, a nonprofit group may experience some resistance from the private bar upon
which it relies for donations should it take on cases that may generate fees. What is more, legal services
organizations funded by the U.S. Legal Services Corporation face a bar on accepting fee-generating
cases. On some of the tensions around nonprofit organizations and some of these issues around fees, see,
for example, Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law
Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 62,
82–85 (2014).
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nonprofit legal services provider, whether that provider is a small,
local organization that addresses local concerns, or a large, national
organization that seeks to promote a national agenda in a particular
field.70 Indeed, the diversity of issues that nonprofit lawyers address
is quite large, from animal rights and environmental justice to claims
on behalf of the transgender community and the rights of low-wage
immigrant workers.71 For lawyers not operating in fields typically
dominated by paying clients, or clients who can be served through
contingency-fee arrangements, lawyers face a different calculus when
it comes to the costs associated with providing representation.72 They
must find funding to provide the representation, and that funding
might come from a government entity, a private foundation, or a
private donor.73 Although the decision to take on a case in the
traditional lawyer–client relationship may come down to whether a
particular client will pay for the services that she will receive from
the lawyer, in the social-change setting, the lawyer must make a
different calculation: whether the case is one that fits within the
constraints that may be imposed by the donor or the source of
funds.74 If the source is a government entity, the client must fit within
the constraints imposed by that source, which is typically a function
of the income of the client or the nature of the case.75 If the source of
the funds that might allow the representation of the client is a private
foundation or an individual donor, the lawyer must ensure she
provides services consistent with the donor’s intent.76
70. For a description of the activities of public interest legal organizations, see generally, Deborah L.
Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2017 (2008).
71. On the range of goals of various public interest legal organizations, see id. at 2036–37.
72. See Carrie Johnson, Legal Help for the Poor in ‘State of Crisis,’ NPR (June 15, 2012, 3:57 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2012/06/15/154925376/legal-help-for-the-poor-in-state-of-crisis
[https://perma.cc/DE3T-MZ32].
73. For a discussion of the different sources of funding for public interest legal organizations, see
Rhode, supra note 70, at 2054–58.
74. On the priority-setting process in public interest legal organizations and the role of funders in
influencing that process, see Rhode, supra note 70, at 2049–53.
75. See Rhode, supra note 62, at 1787.
76. See MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES AND LAW
87 (2003) (arguing that “[f]unding legal work for social justice remains a political battleground in at
least three major areas . . . : the adequacy of resources to the need; the constitutionality of restrictions on

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/1

18

Brescia: Creative Lawyering for Social Change

2019]

CREATIVE LAWYERING

547

The decision to represent a particular client in a particular case is
not made simply on whether the client fits within the confines
imposed by the sources of funds that the organization receives.
Although that is certainly a baseline requirement—i.e., the lawyer’s
organization typically must have funding to provide the services—the
organization will also take into account other concerns when
considering whether to take on the case. In a world of scarce
resources, legal organizations may impose a sort of “lifeboat” ethics
when making decisions with respect to which cases to take.77 The
degree of complexity of the case may make it so resource intensive
that the decision to accept the case might mean that the organization
is unable to accept other clients who might also fit within the
categories of cases that the organization handles. If, for example, the
lawyer takes on a complicated eviction case, then, even if she were to
save the client’s apartment, that representation might mean that three
other families go without representation and face eviction as a result.
Lawyers in these situations must make decisions about which cases
to take based on some rubric of cost, merit, resources required, likely
benefits that might flow from the representation, and the opportunity
cost associated with rejecting other clients.78 Although these
decisions come down to resource constraints and cost-benefits
analyses, not unlike the factors that weigh on the client in the
traditional attorney–client relationship, the social-change lawyer and
the organization in which she works typically make the decision
whether to accept the case for representation. This, unlike in the
traditional lawyer–client relationship where the cost-benefit analysis
is made by the client, adds a layer of complexity to the work that is

lawyers who are funded by the government to serve poor clients; and the constitutionality of additional
sources of funding for services for low-income people raised through legislation”).
77. On so-called “lifeboat ethics” in the context of climate change, see Garrett Hardin, Living on a
Lifeboat, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 210–25 (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed.
1998).
78. For a discussion of opportunity costs, see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
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mostly not present in the traditional setting.79 A private lawyer
certainly may make the decision that despite a client’s desire for
representation, the lawyer may not take on the case, based on her
present workload or other factors.80 These decisions do not take on
the same degree of complexity in the social-change setting. They
may not take on the same moral or social weight either. A private
lawyer turning down a paying client probably can rest assured that
that client will find another lawyer to represent her; that is not
always, or even often, the case with the social-change lawyer.81
Moreover, for the social-change lawyer, there is often another
aspect of the decision to take on a case: whether a particular client’s
case presents itself as a vehicle for furthering the lawyer’s socialchange goals or agenda.82 In other words, one client’s case may offer
the lawyer an opportunity to advance the social-change goals that she
wants to pursue. The factors that go into the decision as to whether a
particular case might advance the social change the lawyer wants to
see are often quite complex, offering another degree of complexity to
legal advocacy for social change.83 For many social-change lawyers,
as with any lawyers, the primary issue they must face when deciding
whether they can take a case is often, first, whether the case has merit
79. For a discussion of some of the considerations that go into the decision to accept or reject cases
in the nonprofit, social-change context, see Paul R. Tremblay, A “Very Moral Type of God”: Triage
Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999). One tension facing a lawyer engaged in
eviction defense work may entail when she is asked to defend a case involving allegations that a client is
engaged in drug trafficking or sale. Id. at 2519. Putting aside problems of proof, racial profiling, the
notion that every defendant is entitled to due process and access to justice, and over-policing in and
prosecution of members of certain communities for the distribution and sale of particular narcotics, is
the vigorous defense of an actual and violent drug dealer in the best interests of the community, and the
other tenants, a lawyer might serve? As a former legal services attorney who often represented tenant
associations in large tenement buildings, my group clients would often resist my efforts to provide
representation to tenants who they felt may endanger the safety of the other residents in their building.
80. For a discussion of some of the pressures on public interest lawyers, at least in the context of a
public defender’s office, that affect the acceptance of cases, see, for example, AM. BAR. ASS’N, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002).
81. See Tremblay, supra note 79, at 2475.
82. See generally Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revising the Old Neighborhood, 32
COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000), reprinted in MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 76, at 182–83 (noting
that a “lawyer is constrained both by codes of professional responsibility and ethical considerations,
which may restrict the lawyer’s ability or willingness to advocate such a course”).
83. Id. at 181.
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and second, whether the lawyer thinks she can win it. But whether
one can win the case is often, itself, a question involving a highly
complicated calculus, as is the case with all lawyering. For the
social-change lawyer, however, even defining what a win is can be
complicated.84 The lawyer may score a moral victory, delay an
eviction or deportation, or apply enough political pressure on a
government agency that it decides to change a policy even when that
policy is upheld by the courts.85 Some of these same considerations
may play into the traditional lawyer’s calculus, but the decision to
proceed is often left to the client in that setting. In the social-change
setting, the lawyer will have to balance the interest of the client
before her, the interest of the broader community in seeing the policy
challenged, and the interests of the funders of the organization in
seeing activity consistent with the organizational goals that the
funder supports. These other interests may weigh on the socialchange lawyer in other ways as well, which introduces considerations
that the traditional lawyer does not typically face.86
4. Social-Change Lawyers Face Different Opportunity Costs
Related to the Trade-Off between Direct Services and LawReform Activities
Another aspect of social-change lawyering that emerges in the face
of resource constraints is that to pursue a long-term legal strategy,
when resources are committed to that strategy (toward what is often
84. For the public interest lawyer, defining what a win is may be difficult, but identifying the direct
and even the indirect effects of legal strategies can also be complex. In his landmark work, Rights at
Work, Michael McCann described some of the indirect effects of legal strategies as their ability to
mobilize constituents, frame a consciousness among group members, and build infrastructure within a
movement, among others. MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 280–84 (1994).
85. In social movement lawyering, a lawyer and the client or clients that she represents can also gain
movement, momentum and strength by losing in the courts. For a reflection on this dynamic, see
generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011).
86. On the tension that sometimes exists between representing particular clients, meeting an
institution’s social-change goals, and addressing the needs of the broader community, see, for example,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976).
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called law reform), that necessarily means that these resources are
channeled away from direct services that might solve a particular
client’s immediate problem without addressing larger social-change
goals.87 Although long- and short-term strategies do not need to be in
tension, they can be when an organization does not have the
resources to do both, and it must choose between law reform and
other similar strategies and emergency, direct, and atomized services
to individual clients.88 When members of the community face real
harm in the absence of legal interventions, social-change lawyers can
face a devastating choice: prevent an eviction, defend against the loss
of custody of a child, or secure public-assistance benefits on the one
hand, or, on the other hand, pursue strategies that might restructure
the legal relationships over time, such that fewer members of the
community face these harrowing outcomes.89 In some ways, these
choices may have become less complex for some lawyers because
they have fewer choices to make: cutbacks to federal funding for
legal-services programs and restrictions imposed on the funding
mean that lawyers in programs receiving funds from this source are
able to serve fewer clients and have fewer tactical choices to choose
from.90 This means that lawyers who do not face these restrictions
87. For a description of this tension between law-reform strategies and the provision of direct
services in social-change advocacy, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 33–34 (1993). For an argument that effective socialchange advocacy should couple targeted, individual case representation with organizing and legislative
reform, see Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA
BRIEFCASE 106, 122 (1977).
88. On navigating the tension between engaging in impact litigation and delivering meaningful
services to individual clients, see DAVIS, supra note 87, at 33.
89. In recent years, organizations have begun to use long-term legal and political strategies while
also addressing the day-to-day needs of their clients. For a description of one organization, the
Workplace Project in New York state, see JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT
FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 78–79 (2009).
90. On the funding cutbacks and programmatic restrictions on federal legal services grantees, see
ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
CIVIL
LEGAL
ASSISTANCE
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
36–37
(2007),
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/publication-1/0158.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FUM4-NHYW] (describing restrictions); Rhode, supra note 70, at 2038. On the
tensions over LSC-funded law reform efforts and direct services, see William P. Quigley, The Demise of
Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the
1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241, 241–42 (1998).
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have more clients to choose from (meaning greater complexity and
choices), even as the overwhelming majority of low-income people
face their legal problems without legal assistance.91
5. Social-Change Lawyering Often Involves Complex Goals
Putting aside the questions of how resources should be deployed in
the service of social change and whether lawyers should choose
between direct services and longer-term strategies, there are often
other larger interests that the social-change lawyer must weigh in the
decision to take on a case.92 If the cause she promotes is a goal
identified by a particular community-based organization or the
expansion of rights for a particular social or demographic group,
taking on a case, pressing certain rights, and bringing them to the
attention of the courts and the general public can sometimes
undermine the long-term interests of the cause that the lawyer
supports. This can spark a backlash and a retrenchment of rights
through the adoption of legislation that undermines any victory that
the lawyer may achieve in the courts, either through the acts of a
hostile legislature or an electorate willing to adopt a ballot initiative
to scale back or reverse the lawyer’s victories.93 In the marriageequality context, lawyers won victories in the state courts in several
states only to have those victories undermined by legislative action
91. By some estimates, eighty percent of the legal needs of the indigent, and forty to sixty percent of
the legal needs of the middle class, go unmet. See, e.g., ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AGENDA FOR ACCESS:
THE
AMERICAN
PEOPLE
AND
CIVIL
JUSTICE
(1996)
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads
/agendaforaccess.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YCZ-C7UG] (describing legal needs of
moderate-income Americans); LEGAL SERVS. CORP., SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOWINCOME AMERICANS: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12–13 (2000) (describing unmet legal needs of
the poor); ROY W. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG LOW-INCOME AND
MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY 7–17 (1994) (describing legal needs of low- and moderate-income households). Deborah Rhode
argues that it is likely that these studies likely underestimate the true scope of the unmet legal needs of
these populations. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 397–98 (2004).
92. See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the
Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1934–35 (1999).
93. Id. at 1932 (“[C]ause lawyers must continually threaten and challenge dominant understandings
of the professional role and the larger process within which that role is performed.”).
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and ballot initiatives.94 Thus, when considering the interests of the
client that presents herself for representation to the social-change
lawyer, that lawyer often must balance the interests of that client
against other interests.95 However, once the lawyer accepts the case
for representation, these other interests should generally factor less in
the decisions that transpire throughout the course of the
representation. But, before the lawyer agrees to accept the
representation of the client, these issues will likely weigh heavily on
her decision to proceed or not to proceed with the case.96
6. Social-Change Lawyers Must Often Choose Between More
Complex Tactics in Pursuit of Complex Goals
If a lawyer decides to take on the case, another decision that the
lawyer must make in the social-change setting, often in consultation
with the client, is the tactics she will deploy in proceeding with the
representation. In the traditional attorney–client relationship, these
decisions might present themselves in a more straightforward way.
The client wants to purchase property. She wants to sue over a breach
of contract. The goals are often more discrete and more easily
identifiable in these traditional settings. For the social-change lawyer,
the goals she might pursue may be more amorphous and present
more challenging problems to solve.97 The lawyer’s social-change
objectives might include improving the treatment of a particular
social group generally or protecting a community from a particularly
94. See Timothy D. Lytton, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, & the Politics of Gun Litigation, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 152,
166 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (describing legislative backlash after gun control lawsuits filed
against gun manufacturers).
95. On the tension between client and other interests in social-change lawyering, see Bell, supra note
86, at 488–93; Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 147, 158–59 (2000).
96. There is an extensive scholarship on public interest intake decisions, much of which is collected
in Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2595–618 (1993).
97. For a discussion of cause lawyering, see Anna-Maria Marshall & Daniel Crocker Hale, Cause
Lawyering, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 301, 307 (2014) (“A poor person whose heat is turned off is
exposed to the risks and vagaries of the legal system in a way that an advocacy organization promoting
prayer in school is not. These factors shape the nature of the clients’ interactions with the cause lawyers
who represent them.”).
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destructive government or business practice. The goals and the tactics
that one might use to achieve them may not present themselves in an
obvious fashion. When the goals are themselves less defined, the
lawyer will often find that choosing among tactics is more complex.
The lawyer, in consultation with the client, will likely weigh the
potential costs and benefits of the different tactics to achieve the
overarching goals of the representation, introducing even more
complexity into the situation.98
7. Social-Change Lawyers May Find It Difficult to Identify the
Client.
There is another layer of complexity beyond defining the goals of
the representation or the tactics used to achieve them. Indeed, socialchange lawyering sometimes involves debate over identifying the
client in each situation.99 Is the client the individual or group who
presents himself, herself, or itself to the lawyer for representation? Or
is the client someone or some group that the lawyer has identified as
a strategic partner serving to advance the cause that the lawyer seeks
to further?100 Sometimes the social-change lawyer goes out in search
of the appropriate client who may serve as a participant in the socialchange strategy because that idealized and sought-after client’s
situation is sympathetic or compelling. The client’s situation may
offer a salient narrative that illuminates the plight of those whose
situations the social-change lawyer wants to improve. It may also
present facts that help garner support from the courts, policymakers,
or legislators whom the lawyer may need to convince to embrace and

98. For a discussion of the lawyer’s role in these situations, see generally William L.F. Felstiner,
Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980).
99. Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 25, 31–34 (2011) (discussing models of litigation on behalf of groups of individuals and
tensions that can arise in social-change lawyering).
100. Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspective on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 207, 234 (1976) (“[W]hen a public interest firm identifies a critical issue, it rarely has any
difficulty in finding a client willing to pursue the matter.”).
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advance the cause.101 This search for the client or clients that help fill
this narrative role might mean that the client in these settings may
assume a different role than one in the traditional lawyer–client
relationship.102 Contemporary legal ethics requires even the socialchange lawyer to maintain a relationship with every client such that
the client controls the critical ends of the representation.103 When the
lawyer may have a different sense of who the client is in any given
situationwhether it is the person who is the nominal representative
plaintiff in a class action, the community that the individual
represents, or someone or some other entity or groupthe lawyer’s
sense of whom she serves may change. The social-change lawyer
may thus perceive that she is entitled to have a different relationship
with a specific client in a particular matter because the social-change
lawyer might see a living, breathing client as representing some
larger cause or interest. This then means that the process of
identifying the clients’ interests and needs, and the tactics the lawyer
should pursue, becomes more complex, and the lawyer, whether or
not we like it, must try to understand who the client is, what the client
wants, and how the lawyer should proceed on the client’s behalf. But
all of that depends on how the lawyer defines the client. When the
client is an amorphous group like “the community,” with no clear
spokesperson or constituent who can provide guidance to the lawyer
as to the interests and preferred tactics of the client, the process of
identifying both who the client is and how the lawyer should proceed
becomes more challenging.104 Admittedly, some lawyers may feel
that this gives them license to proceed as they see fit, substituting
101. See Marshall & Hale, supra note 97, at 312 (arguing that “many cause lawyers enjoy more
collaborative relationships with their clients . . . [the] clients . . . tend to be social movement
organizations, for whom additional resources may be helpful in directing their attorneys’ energies”).
102. See id. (“These organizational practices may draw cause lawyers into the ambit of activism,
where they share in a movement’s collective identity, and that identity, in turn, shapes the way that
cause lawyers practice law. “).
103. See generally Marshall, supra note 95. For a discussion of some of the legal ethics issues that
arise in group settings, see Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 298–305 (2015).
104. For an exploration of some of these issues, see generally Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who’s in
Charge Anyway? A Proposal for Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831 (1998).
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their sense of what that undefined, incorporeal “client” wants; for
other lawyers, who truly want to ensure that they proceed with the
interests of a client or clients at the center of what they do, that
process becomes only harder, not easier.105
C. What Complexity Means for Social-Change Lawyers
When comparing the social-change lawyer’s role to that of what I
have called a traditional lawyers, it would appear that there is some
greater level of complexity that adds to the general complexity of the
problem that the lawyer is attempting to address. The decision to
accept or reject a client often has different components in the socialchange context when compared to that decision in the traditional,
private relationship. In fact, that identity of the client may itself shift
when the lawyer is engaged in social-change lawyering. In turn, that
shift in the identity of the client means that the considerations and
factors that a lawyer must weigh are also different and more
complex.106 So, the additional complexity often centers around which
clients to accept for representation, which strategies to deploy to
achieve their goals, the tactics to use in pursuing those strategies, the
direction the lawyer should take, and whom to take direction from
when pursuing those tactics and strategies. To a certain extent, some
of these decisions play a role in the traditional lawyer–client
relationship, but generally, they involve a greater deal of complexity
in the social-change context. This complexity brings new dimensions
to problem solving in this type of advocacy, requiring a greater
degree of creativity from the social-change lawyer in pursuing
solutions to the problems.
Despite these additional considerations that lawyers working for
social change have faced when engaging in creative problem solving
for their clients (however they define those clients), lawyers have
long played roles in attempting to help engineer social change. The
unsuccessful litigation that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in
105. Id. at 857–58.
106. Id. at 856–57.
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Plessy v. Ferguson, which enshrined the doctrine of “separate but
equal,” was in many ways the product of the type of legal campaign
that became commonplace by the 1970s.107 The prominent role that
lawyers played in the Civil Rights Movement helped to serve as a
model for efforts of progressive lawyers that have sought to promote
environmental protection, women’s rights, the rights of different
racial and ethnic groups such as the Latinx and Asian-American
communities, and LGBTQ rights.108 It also prompted the rise of
conservative legal organizations that promoted a probusiness or
libertarian agenda through the courts.109
With some degree of urgency, there is a growing understanding
that the law must be used to promote social justice and social change,
but there is also an emerging appreciation for the fact that there is not
just one way to use the law to promote social justice and that those
who would use the law to do so must be sensitive to community
needs. This work is thus not only tactically flexible “but also
responsive and accountable to community interests and needs.”110
Scott Cummings describes this reemergence, with a focus on
advocates seeking to promote workers’ rights, as follows: “[L]abor
activists have, in fact, begun to leverage a broader range of legal
regimes to advance multiple labor goals, from direct worker
mobilization to the protection and expansion of unionized
industries.”111 They have done this by filing suits pressing
international human rights claims “to mobilize immigrant
workers,”112 bringing land use claims “in an effort to block big-box
107. For a discussion about the effort of early social-change lawyers to challenge Jim Crow,
unsuccessfully, in the campaign that ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson, see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 28–60
(1988).
108. For an overview of the role of some of these identity-based groups on social change, see
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).
109. On the emergence of conservative legal organizations, see generally ANN SOUTHWORTH,
LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 1–2 (2008).
110. Brescia, supra note 57, at 727.
111. Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles Anti-Sweatshop
Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2009) (citations omitted).
112. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/1

28

Brescia: Creative Lawyering for Social Change

2019]

CREATIVE LAWYERING

557

retailers from entering markets dominated by unionized groceries,”113
and “threatened environmental lawsuits”114 to strengthen their
negotiating position when seeking “community benefit agreements
with labor-friendly provisions.”115 Cummings argues that this
suggests that “a more fundamental reorientation is under way within
the labor movement”116 because activists are adopting what he calls a
“legal pluralist”117 approach, which recognizes the many ways in
which the law interacts with the employer-employee relationship to
“leverage the power of law to advance labor goals.”118 This work is
thus a “more politically integrated, tactically versatile model of legal
practice,”119 where legal victories are only “moments in broader
campaigns to stimulate collective action and leverage political
reform”120 as opposed to ends in themselves. As Cummings further
explains, litigation affords advocates just “one of many problem[]solving tools,” and clients are “allies to be educated and empowered
for future struggles.”121 Other scholars have identified the ways in
which low-wage worker legal advocacy has embraced this
accountable and tactically pluralistic approach.122
This embrace is also evident in the housing context.123 In my own
work and research, I was a part of, and attempted to assess, the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Cummings, supra note 111, at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 72
(2005) (describing work of the Workplace Project in Hempstead, New York); Sameer M. Ashar, Law
Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 391–93 (2008) (describing legal
advocacy with restaurant workers in New York City); Cummings, supra note 111, at 9–61 (describing
the attempt to provide representation to sweatshop workers in Los Angeles).
123. See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charne, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some Comments on Feldman’s
Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633 app. 2 at 1664–68 (1995) (describing “Eviction
Free Zone” in Massachusetts); Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for
Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 913 (2009) (describing legal advocacy in support of tenant
association in Los Angeles); Brescia, supra note 57, at 716–17 (describing effort to preserve affordable
housing in New York City through the use of a range of legal tactics); Judith E. Koons, Fair Housing
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coordinated effort to fight the radical transformation of what were
once middle-class and working poor housing developments in New
York City, Peter Cooper Village, and Stuyvesant Town, into luxury
housing for the very rich.124 That effortwhich combined
community education, grassroots organizing, direct services through
brief advice and assistance and direct representation, and an
affirmative class action caseultimately prevented the conversion of
affordable housing to unaffordable housing.125 This was done in a
tactically pluralistic way in collaboration with a range of community
partners, including an engaged, local elected official, a robust tenant
association, and nonprofit lawyers and private lawyers working on
contingency.126 That work showed that lawyers from different
backgrounds and experiences had a range of tactics to bring about
important social change or at least prevent an erosion of significant
economic rights from befalling the residents of these
developments.127 This required effective coalition building and
efficient delivery of targeted, customized, and focused representation
and assistance to balance the need for direct services that would
prevent displacement while bringing tactical affirmative litigation to
ensure the protection of broader comprehensive rights for the
collective benefit of the residents of these developments. This tactical
pluralism provided effective relief and required creativity in terms of
pulling together both the different strands of the services to be
provided as well as the individuals and organizations that would
provide them. The complex problem of preserving affordable
housing required innovative legal and advocacy strategies, as well as
a diverse team of stakeholders and service providers, to bring about a
successful outcome.128
and Community Empowerment: Where the Roof Meets Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY
75, 87–95 (1996) (describing techniques utilized to prevent housing displacement due to urban
redevelopment).
124. Brescia, supra note 57, at 716–17.
125. See id. at 717 (describing campaign).
126. Id. at 716–17.
127. Id. at 717.
128. Id.
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The work of labor rights activists and the housing lawyers
involved in the effort to defend affordable housing in New York City
shows that lawyers engaged in problem solving in pursuit of social
change face additional creative challenges that add new dimensions
to their work when compared to the work of traditional lawyers.
Despite these challenges, as the following Part shows using just three
examples (though there are many more from which to choose),
lawyers working for social change have helped bring about dramatic
change by playing a role in reforming the legal institutions that
structure the relations between individuals, communities, broader
society, and the government. Lawyers have helped spark meaningful
change in terms of improving civil, political, and human rights for
countless millions of Americans.129 Thus, lawyers have found ways
to confront the complexities associated with social-change lawyering
with creativity and zeal, helping to advance new understandings of
the United States Constitution, the laws, and social relations in the
United States.130 I will highlight lessons we can learn from the
examples of these successful efforts to bring about positive social
change, particularly efforts which involved creative solutions to
solving complex social problems. The next section uses three
examples of lawyers playing a role in addressing complex social
problems through legal advocacy to identify some of the common
approaches and themes of these lawyers.
II. Lawyering for Social Change
This Part describes the role that lawyers played in three moments
of significant social change in the United States: the effort to combat
slavery, the decades-long struggle for civil rights for African
Americans, and the campaign for marriage equality for members of
the LGBTQ community. In the first example, much larger forces
played a greater role in ultimately bringing about an end to slavery.
129. See infra Part II.
130. See generally COLE, supra note 7 (describing several legal advocacy campaigns in recent
decades).
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Yet, lawyers played an important role in addressing the treatment of
slaves in the law, particularly escaped slaves, and that approach
helped inform the larger effort to end slavery.131 In the Civil Rights
Movement and the effort to attain marriage equality, lawyers played
central roles (and at least in the Civil Rights Movement, subsequent
critiques have argued that their role was too central).132 In each of
these examples, however, the lawyers’ work did not operate in a
vacuum. All of the lawyers were sensitive to forces playing out in the
wider world, brought in other disciplines to support their efforts, and
sought to form broad coalitions. What follows is a description of each
of these three examples of lawyers working for social change.
Subsequent parts explore some common themes that emerge from
this analysis as well as what this analysis might say about creative
lawyering for social change now and in the future.
A. Lawyers and the Abolition of Slavery in the United States
The first example to explore recounts the efforts of two lawyers
who played roles in the effort to end slavery in the United States: one
famous and one not-so-famous. Of course, lawyers had a significant
hand in crafting the laws that first enshrined slavery in the United
States Constitution133 and then in the many legislative compromises
and proposals that ultimately proved unsuccessful in either
maintaining or ending slavery, with the failure of the efforts to end
slavery peaceably ultimately leading to the United States Civil
War.134 One of the main tensions between the Northern and Southern
states was the Fugitive Slave Act, which had been updated as part of
the package of legislative measures that became the Compromise of
1850.135 The 1850 version of the law allowed any slave holder whose
131. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 159 (1975).
132. See, e.g., Bell, Jr., supra note 86, at 490, n.59.
133. JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (2018) (describing
makeup of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, including roughly half of those in attendance being
lawyers).
134. Id.
135. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 78–88 (describing
Fugitive Slave Law as part of the Compromise of 1850 and the tensions that arose from it).
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slave escaped to a free state or territory to petition federal authorities
to return that slave to his or her master.136 Riots would sometimes
occur in free states when federal authorities would move in to
enforce the law because abolitionists would seek to protect the
escaped slave from a return to bondage.137
With the outbreak of the Civil War, a question remained whether a
slave holder from a Confederate state (or even a non-seceding slave
state like Maryland) could enforce the law despite the open
hostilities.138 An abolitionist general in the Union Army in the
Western theater, John C. Frémont, issued a military proclamation
freeing the slaves of any slave holder in Missouri who took up arms
in rebellion.139 Abolitionists cheered this move, but conservatives in
the north did not approve of it. President Abraham Lincoln was
concerned that these efforts might alienate border states that still
recognized slavery. Ultimately, Frémont rescinded the order.140
Another Union officer, Benjamin Butler, a lawyer-turned-general
who was commanding Fort Monroea Union garrison in northern
Virginiatook a slightly different approach. This creative approach
helped advance the abolitionist cause on firmer ground than
Frémont’s efforts had done.141 When three slaves who had been
forced to assist the Confederate forces in building breastworks across
the river from the Union fortress slipped away under the cover of
darkness behind Union lines and presented themselves to Butler, he
was forced to confront the applicability and enforceability of the
Fugitive Slave Act. Butler seems to have had a complicated view of
slavery.142 Because he was a northern Democrat before the war, some
paint him as an abolitionist, and others reveal he very much feared
136. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) (repealed 1864). On the role of judges in
enforcing the fugitive slave laws, see generally COVER, supra note 131.
137. See Roy E. Finkenbine, Christiana Riot (1851), in SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (VOL. I) 222 (Junius P. Rodriguez, ed., 2007) for an
account of one riot.
138. Id.
139. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 198 (2012).
140. Id. at 202.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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that free slaves might, if armed, rise up in rebellion and strike out
mercilessly against slave owners and their families.143
Nevertheless, as any self-respecting lawyer should do when faced
with whether to apply a law to a particular situation, he consulted the
text of the Fugitive Slave Act.144 For Butler, a plain reading of the
law seemed to require that a slave owner residing in a slave state
could petition federal authorities for return of an escaped slave.145
But, Butler read the law literally, and took into account the position
of the slave states, those in open rebellion like Virginia, from which
these slaves had escaped.146 That position held that Virginia, because
it had claimed that it seceded from the Union, was no longer a
state.147 And if it was no longer a state, a slave owner from Virginia
could no longer claim rights under the Fugitive Slave Act.148
Moreover, Butler took into account the role the slaves had played
in supporting the enemy troops across the river. They had been
dragooned into helping to build fortifications opposing the Union
position and thus had supported the Confederate war effort.149
Logically, if Butler had come across a cache of Confederate
gunpowder or cannons, it would be preposterous to expect that he
would return “contraband” of war to the rebel forces. Butler claimed
that the slaves were no different; they too were contraband, and he
would not return them to the Southern side.150 Again, Butler used his
143. MARTIN A. KLEIN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 76 (2002); see also
WITT, supra note 139, at 202 (describing Butler as “no abolitionist, at least not at the beginning of the
war”). For Southerners, he was later dubbed “the Devil of New Orleans” for what are described as
heavy-handed and corrupt tactics when he was in command of the Union occupation there. See
generally CHESTER G. HEARN, WHEN THE DEVIL CAME DOWN TO DIXIE: BEN BUTLER IN NEW
ORLEANS (1997). According to his autobiography, Butler fought for the Union not out of opposition to
slavery; he defended the Southern states’ rights to pass their own laws regarding the institution.
BENJAMIN BUTLER, BUTLER’S BOOK: AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF MAJORGENERAL BENJAMIN BUTLER 129–136 (2014).
144. BUTLER, supra note 143, at 131.
145. Id. at 128.
146. JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1861–1865, at 96 (2012).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 95.
150. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 343 (1995).
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enemy’s own logic against it, arguing that slaves were property and
used to aid in the enemy war effort. As such, he determined he
should not return them. Indeed, when a Confederate officer, acting as
an emissary of the Confederate Colonel, whom Butler knew from his
days as a politician, appeared under flag of truce to claim ownership
of the slaves, reclaim the slaves, and enforce the Fugitive Slave Act,
Butler refused.151 According to Butler’s autobiography, he told the
adversary the following: “‘I mean to take Virginia at her word, as
declared in the ordinance of secession passed yesterday. I am under
no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia
now claims to be.’”152 Butler’s position angered abolitionists like
Frederick Douglass, who proclaimed that these escaped slaves were
not to be considered contraband as if they were pistols;153
nevertheless, Butler’s clever use of the Southern arguments to
undermine their position seemed to offer a basis upon which Butler
could conclude that he was under no obligation to return the escaped
slaves. It would also solve a problem that President Lincoln faced:
how to hold his coalitiona collection of factions that included those
who wanted to abolish slavery and those who wanted to save the
Uniontogether. The value of this decision for assuaging the
different factions within Lincoln’s coalition was not lost on an
editorial published in the Atlantic Monthly at the time. It stated:
There is often great virtue in such technical phrases in
shaping public opinion. They commend practical action to
a class of minds little developed in the direction of the
sentiments, which would be repelled by formulas of a
broader and nobler import. The venerable gentleman, who
wears gold spectacles and reads a conservative daily,
prefers confiscation to emancipation. He is reluctant to
have slaves declared freemen, but has no objection to their

151. WITT, supra note 139, at 202–03.
152. BUTLER, supra note 143, at 257.
153. WITT, supra note 139, at 202–03.
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being declared contrabands. His whole nature rises in
insurrection when Beecher preaches in a sermon that a
thing ought to be done because it is a duty, but he yields
gracefully when Butler issues an order commanding it to be
done because it is a military necessity.154
Nevertheless, Butler’s position put another lawyer, Abraham
Lincoln, in an uncomfortable spot, just as Frémont had been in
months earlier. As said, Lincoln had a fragile coalition of unionists,
who were supporting the war effort to preserve the republic, and
abolitionists, who believed it was a crusade to end slavery.155 Lincoln
needed some way to tie this coalition together, and he considered the
question of whether to bring escaped slaves and free blacks into the
war effort by arming them and forming black regiments to fight on
the Union side.156 He knew he was depleting his stock of eligible
fighting men in the North and saw the opportunity that presented
itself of recruiting thousands of blacks to join the war effort.157 But
he also knew that he would have to take steps toward freeing the
slaves, at least escaped slaves and those liberated from southern
territories, to offer these potential recruits and the abolitionists who
supported freeing the slaves cause to support black enlistment.158 His
policies toward slavery over the years had evolved.159 At times, he
supported colonization for freed slaves, and at others, he supported
compensation for slave owners who might be forced to give up their
slaves.160 Lincoln ultimately settled on the notion that to keep his

154. Edward L. Pierce, The Contrabands at Fort Monroe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1861, at 627.
The individual referred to in the excerpt as “Beecher” is likely Presbyterian minister Lyman Beecher,
father of Harriet Beecher Stowe, who authored the abolitionist publication Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Id.
155. DONALD, supra note 150, at 313.
156. Id. at 373–76.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Lincoln’s Evolving Thoughts on Slavery and Freedom, NPR (Oct. 11, 2010, 12:11 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2010/10/11/130489804/lincolns-evolving-thoughts-on-slavery-and-freedom
[https://perma.cc/JN7G-T9K7].
160. DONALD, supra note 150, at 343; Lincoln’s Evolving Thoughts on Slavery and Freedom, supra
note 159.
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coalition together, he would need to support the enlistment of black
troops while giving them and their supporters a reason to enlist.
Lincoln believed that this would satisfy the unionists who recognized
the need to recruit black troops to support the war effort and the
desire of the abolitionists to end slavery, at least in the South.161 This
two-pronged approach culminated in the drafting of Emancipation
Proclamation, which freed slaves in occupied territories and those
who escaped to Union lines (a recognition, in a way, of the
predicament in which Butler found himself and a nod to his on-thefly solution). But Lincoln still faced another hurdle before he could
release the Proclamation.
The Union war effort had stalled. General McClellan’s campaign
to strike decisively at the heart of the Confederacy had ground to a
frustrating halt on the Virginia peninsula.162 Grant had not yet
emerged as the brilliant and dogged tactician that he later proved to
be in subsequent years, and his campaign in the Mississippi was not
going well.163 The major foreign powers of Great Britain and France
watched developments in the war with great interest, poised to
recognize the Confederacy, if not aid it outright, if it appeared that
the South might be able to secure some kind of brokered peace and
remain intact.164 Were Lincoln to release the Emancipation
Proclamation at a point when the Union war effort was going poorly,
he might seem weak, and its issuance a desperate, last-ditch effort to
alter the course of the war. Lincoln needed a victory on the battlefield
to give him an opening in which he could issue the Proclamation. He
got one when Robert E. Lee tested the Union resolve in a march on
Maryland, a slave state that, the Southern general felt, might have
welcomed Confederate troops as heroes as opposed to invaders. This
move would also likely have had the effect of drawing McClellan’s

161. DONALD, supra note 150, at 373–76.
162. Id. at 369–70.
163. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 135, at 578 (describing failure of the first Vicksburg
campaign).
164. Id. at 383 (describing Confederate efforts for diplomatic recognition from Great Britain and
France).
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troops away from their likely march on Richmond. But, “Little
Napoleon,” as he was called, never exhibited any of the French
emperor’s aggressiveness on the battlefield. McClellan’s forces
clashed with Lee’s near the tiny town of Antietam in Maryland,
which ultimately lent its name to the bloody melee that ensued
there.165 Although historians often consider the battle a stalemate,
Lee’s retreat from the field, after both sides suffered heavy losses,
gave Lincoln the opportunity he needed to claim victory and issue the
Emancipation Proclamation at one of the few high points of the war
for the North, at least to that point.166 This edict helped unite
Lincoln’s fragile coalition around the cause of ending slavery
because it was the effort to end slavery, in Lincoln’s eyes, that would
ultimately bring about the preservation of the Union.
Lincoln’s chosen tactics in promoting abolition, at least in the
Confederate states, was consistent with a prior statement on the
interplay between abolition and maintaining the integrity of the
nation. In a letter to abolitionist publisher Horace Greeley, Lincoln
emphasized that his primary goal was to save the Union.167 To do so,
he believed he needed to end slavery. Thus, his war aims and those of
the abolitionists who sought to end slavery converged. Lincoln wrote:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union,
and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the
Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could
save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would
also do that.
What I do about slavery and the [colored] race, I do
because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I
165. DONALD, supra note 150, at 374. It is telling that the divisions between the North and South
were so deep that the battle is often referred to not as the Battle of Antietam in the South but as the
Battle of Sharpsburg. Battle of Antietam, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/american-civilwar/battle-of-antietam [https://perma.cc/4EXL-AA4M] (last updated Oct. 2, 2018).
166. DONALD, supra note 150, at 374.
167. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862) in
SPEECHES AND LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 194–95 (Merwin Roe ed. photo. reprt. 1912) (1907).
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forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to
save the Union.168
Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation was
consistent with this approach. It satisfied the abolitionists for sure but
also tied the unionists to the abolitionist cause by linking
emancipation directly to the war effort. As one excerpt of the
Proclamation reads:
And I further declare and make known that such persons of
suitable condition will be received into the armed service of
the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and
other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said
service.169
Lincoln, the tactician, proved to be adept and creative at using a
legal strategy—here, the Emancipation Proclamation—and timing it
in light of a major development in the war (the Battle of Antietam) to
help achieve what appears to have been his ultimate social-change
goal: preservation of the Union.
Of course, the cause of civil rights would not end with the victory
of Union forces or even passage of the Reconstruction Amendments
to the Constitution. The next example to highlight is the effort to end
Jim Crow segregation, which followed the collapse of the effort to
reform the South in the wake of Reconstruction.170
B. Lawyers and the End of Jim Crow
Unlike most discussions of this legal campaign, hatched in the
offices of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
168. Id. at 194–95.
169. The Emancipation Proclamation, Proclamation No. 95, 12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1863); see also
Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 851–57
(2011) (describing the Emancipation Proclamation and its effects).
170. DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW
WORLD 327 (2006) (tracing rise of Jim Crow to the demise of Reconstruction).
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People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and those of other legal
allies, I will not start with a discussion of the landmark case Brown v.
Board of Education, in which the Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that segregation in educational institutions violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.171 This was the beginning of the end of the institutional
edifice of Jim Crow. The paradigm of social-change litigation, which
took direct legal aim at segregation in broad-based challenges, had its
predecessors in more modest, incremental, and narrowly crafted
challenges. This eventually assisted other institutions in their efforts
to build the legal case that could serve as a base to successfully
launch the broader attack on segregation.172
Heman Sweatt was a postman in Texas who wanted to go to law
school in the late 1940s.173 The problem was that there were no law
schools in the state of Texas that admitted African Americans.174
Sweatt submited his application to the University of Texas School of
Law, asserting that because the state university system did not have a
separate law school for African Americans, the law school had to
admit him.175 The state hastily put together what it tried to call a law
school, but that entity had no full-time faculty (it “borrowed” faculty
from the main law school), no law books, no alumni base, and no
accreditation.176 The LDF challenged the university’s solution to the
Sweatt application, arguing that, yes, segregation was
unconstitutional.177 The lawyers also had a fallback position,
171. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). For a history of the Brown litigation, see
generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263 (1975).
172. On early challenges to segregation in education and other contexts, see GARY M. LAVERGNE,
BEFORE BROWN: HEMAN MARION SWEATT, THURGOOD MARSHALL, AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE
73–85 (2010) (addressing early challenges to segregation in education and other contexts); MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP: LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 70
(1987). For a description of civil rights organizing before these campaigns, see SUSAN D. CARLE,
DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880–1915, at 6 (2013).
173. LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 5.
174. Id.
175. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632 (1950); LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 95.
176. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
177. LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 97.
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however. They argued that, taking the holding in Plessy v. Ferguson
literally, if the university planned on offering separate institutions,
the system had to make those institutions equal.178
By any objective measure, the law school for African Americans
was in no way equal to that offered to white students in the
University of Texas system. The unaccredited school for African
Americans with no faculty, essentially no students, and no books
could not measure up to the University of Texas’s school of law,
which had 850 students, a vast alumni network, 65,000 books in its
library, and full accreditation.179 Even when the case went to trial and
the law school for African Americans had twenty-three students, five
full-time faculty, and 10,000 books, it still could not compare in
quality or degree to the opportunities afforded to the students
enrolled in the all-white institution.180 Even putting aside these
objective measures, the LDF lawyers also argued that a law school is
so much more than the books in its library or the physical
accommodations. A law school is a platform for knowledge exchange
and a network that creates mentorships and job opportunities for its
students. It connects those students to the bench and the broader
practicing bar. A good law school is more than just the sum of its
parts and develops value to its students because of the relationship of
those parts to each other and the broader community. A law school
with fewer faculty, no alumni network, and weak ties to the broader
community could not possibly afford its students with the same
opportunities that the University of Texas’s law school for whites
offered its students.181
Although the lawyers knew all of these things about the qualities
that make a great law school, they knew something else as well. They
intuited that the judges would also know this about a law school.182
178. Id. at 100.
179. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
180. Id.
181. See LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 101–02 (noting Justice Robert Jackson’s incredulity in oral
argument in a prior case regarding the University of Oklahoma’s arguments about separate and equal
law schools).
182. On the legal strategy in Sweatt and the other graduate school cases, see CONSTANCE BAKER
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The judges before whom such a case would come would all have
gone to law school and know the ineffable qualities of a good law
school, and they could compare the extent to which two law schools
were comparable along these difficult to measure metrics. Although
the LDF had tried to bring other somewhat successful lawsuits
challenging segregation in other graduate and professional schools, it
was the action filed against segregation in a separate and unequal law
school where they gained the greatest legal traction.183 Although they
would certainly include a direct challenge to segregation itself, and
they enlisted the support of an anthropologist (who was also a
lawyer) to make the claim that segregation was itself stigmatizing
(foreshadowing the arguments they made in Brown), they also relied
on a secondary position that even if one recognized that separate but
equal was still the law of the land and Plessy was good law, if one
took Plessy seriously, the separate and clearly unequal institution set
up as the law school for African Americans in the University of
Texas law school would not pass muster.184 Moreover, by
challenging the way in which segregation operated in an institution
that judges would understand well, the LDF lawyers made a brilliant
tactical decision to appeal to the judge’s own appreciation for the
special qualities upon which one can compare separate institutions,
more so, perhaps, than they might understand other institutions that
the LDF might target.185 Ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously
concluded in Sweatt v. Painter not that segregation was
unconstitutional on its face, but, rather, that the operation of a
MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 60, 64 (1998), and JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 69–78
(1994).
183. For a review of these earlier setbacks, see TUSHNET, supra note 172, at 70–104. On the strategy
of targeting segregation in graduate schools, see ROBERT J. COTTROL, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 58–76 (2003). The NAACP had begun to gain traction with
these cases involving graduate schools, however, and, on the same day the Court decided Sweatt, it ruled
that onerous conditions imposed on a student seeking a graduate degree in a school of education were
also unconstitutional. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642
(1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337, 349 (1938).
184. LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 103–05 (describing trial strategy in Sweatt).
185. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
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separateand clearly unequallaw school for African Americans
could not pass constitutional muster.186
One of the reasons—apart from the objective criteria—that the
Court reached this conclusion was that it was “more important” that
the law school for whites “possesses to a far greater degree those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school.”187 These qualities included but
were not limited to the following: the “reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the
alumni, standing in the community, traditions[,] and prestige.”188
Although the Court could easily differentiate the two schools along
objective criteria, the Court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to believe
that one who had a free choice between these law schools would
consider the question close.”189 Moreover, “Few students and no one
who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic
vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of
views with which the law is concerned.”190 The school for African
Americans “excludes from its student body members of the racial
groups which number 85% of the population of the [s]tate and
include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges[,] and other
officials with whom [the] petitioner will inevitably be dealing when
he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.”191 For these reasons, the
Court could not conclude “that the education offered [to the]
petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if
admitted to the University of Texas Law School.”192
In many ways, this incremental challenge to segregation ultimately
set the stage for the lawyers’ work that followed in bringing the
broader challenges to segregation in primary and secondary
educational institutions in several jurisdictions across the country that
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
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would culminate in the victory in Brown. In those challenges, the
LDF lawyers brought in experts from other disciplines, like
sociology, to establish that segregation had a stigmatizing effect.193
They built on the arguments made in Sweatt that separate was
inherently unequal, and, once again, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously in their favor, this time concluding that separate but
equal would no longer stand.194
C. Lawyers and Marriage Equality
The final example to examine is the work of the lawyers who
helped lead the successful campaign for recognition of marriage
equality for the LGBTQ community. That campaign, which was
really many campaignsthe first of which began in the early 1990s
in Hawaiiproceeded in fits and starts.195 There were victories in the
courts in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts on state constitutional
grounds, but at least some of those victories were undermined by
legislative action or the work of advocacy groups that organized
ballot initiatives to overrule those courts by adopting constitutional
amendments that barred recognition of same-sex marriage.196 In
addition, fear that states where same-sex marriage was not legal
would be expected to recognize same-sex marriages from states
where they were legal prompted Congress to take legislative action
and pass the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The DOMA allowed
states the option to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage with
respect to a range of federal benefits that accrued to married
heterosexuals.197 Moreover, the forces aligned against marriage
equality gained enough momentum that they sought to introduce
anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiatives in many states, mostly timed
193. See MOTLEY, supra note 182, at 61–73 (describing use of experts in Brown trials); e.g., KLUGER,
supra note 171, at 315–39.
194. MOTLEY, supra note 182, at 102, 104–05.
195. FRANK, supra note 49, at 169 (describing LGBTQ rights advocacy in state courts).
196. Id. at 165.
197. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), invalidated
by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/1

44

Brescia: Creative Lawyering for Social Change

2019]

CREATIVE LAWYERING

573

to generate conservative voter turnout for the 2004 presidential
election.198 Most of these ballot initiatives succeeded.199 When
conservative groups sought to promote a ballot initiative in
California, a deeply liberal state, many thought they had gone too far
and that the state’s voters would reject it.200
On election night 2008, when the nation was electing its first
African-American president, and voters in California voted
overwhelmingly in his favor, Californian voters passed so-called
Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in the state.201 This
came as a shock to advocates for same-sex marriage across the
nation, leading them to take stock of their efforts and consider what,
if anything, they might do differently in the future to promote samesex marriage and rebound from this devastating defeat.202
Advocates in the LGBTQ community and their allies conducted a
review of their efforts in an attempt to defeat Proposition 8.203 They
worked with researchers to conduct focus groups and surveys of
voters to assess what they had done wrong and how they might
change their strategies and tactics.204 This review produced startling
results.205 They learned that the way they had been going about
promoting same-sex marriage was all wrong. They had made
legalistic arguments, like same-sex couples were denied hospital
visiting privileges and other benefits granted to heterosexual
couples.206 These types of arguments, they learned, left many
potential allies cold and led them to believe that the marriageequality advocates were seeking something different than what
heterosexual couples achieved through marriage.207 Voters told
advocates that they thought the advocates were looking for special
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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treatment for same-sex couples. For the advocates, nothing was
further from the truth. Indeed, what the advocates wanted was simply
equal treatment: i.e., marriage equality.208 They took this feedback to
heart and began to shift their message in subtle yet powerful ways.
They began to advocate for marriage equality, not same-sex
marriage.209 They stressed that what the LGQBTQ community
wanted was equal recognition of their relationships and equal access
to the institution of marriage on the same terms as heterosexual
couples.210 This subtle shift began to turn the tide.211
In addition to the shift in messaging, as with the desegregation
litigation, legal advocates challenging Proposition 8 in the courts
deployed sociology and psychology expert witnesses to undermine
the key arguments of the ballot initiative’s supporters.212
In 2012, just four years after the devastating loss in California,
advocates won ballot initiatives in Maine, Minnesota, Maryland and
Washington State.213 Two years later, they won a challenge to certain
core aspects of DOMA in United States v. Windsor.214 Finally, in
2015, they won the landmark Obergefell v. Hodges case,215 which
established that states could not deny members of the LGBTQ
community access to marriage. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, sided with those who favored the marriage equality

208. FRANK, supra note 49, at 96, 162–63.
209. See id. at 167.
210. See id. at 7–8.
211. See id. at 188.
212. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2010). In Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, Letitia Anne Peplau, Distinguished Research Professor of Psychology Emerita at
UCLA, testified that most individuals who marry benefit socially, physically, and psychologically as a
result of being married. Transcript of Proceedings at 574, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(No. C 09-2292-VRW). She further testified that same-sex relationships are similar in quality and nature
to heterosexual relationships and if allowed to marry, same-sex couples would derive the same benefits
as heterosexual couples. Id. Michael Lamb, a Psychology Professor at the University of Cambridge,
provided testimony regarding parenting, explaining that research has shown that effective parenting
does not require opposite sex parents. Id. at 1013–14. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW:
MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL: THE STORY OF HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY (2015) (recounts
Proposition 8 litigation).
213. FRANK, supra note 49, at 285, 287.
214. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013).
215. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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arguments as opposed to the “special treatment” arguments that
preceded the loss in the Proposition 8 fight. Justice Kennedy wrote:
[B]y virtue of their exclusion from that institution, samesex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the
[s]tates have linked to marriage. This harm results in more
than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned
to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem
intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself
makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it
attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important
respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock
them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent
purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest
meaning.216
The triumph of the marriage-equality campaign follows a tradition
of creative lawyering for social change that dates back to the Civil
War era and even to the framing of the United States Constitution. I
have used three examples of lawyers who contributed to successful
efforts to bring about social change. Are there common lessons that
one can draw from these experiences? The next Part addresses this
question.
III. A Taxonomy of Creative Social-Change Lawyering
This review of the role of lawyers in the campaigns to end slavery
in the United States, defeat Jim Crow, and advance the cause of
marriage equality for the LGBTQ community reveals some common
themes of that work and the ways in which lawyers working for
social change can adopt creative strategies for promoting that change.
216. Id. at 2601–02.
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As the following discussion shows, some of these themes include that
the work is often incremental and iterative; it involves what is
sometimes referred to as “reframing”—looking at issues in new, and
different ways, especially the arguments of one’s opponents; it often
borrows from other disciplines; it seeks out opportunities for interest
convergence among otherwise disparate groups; and it does not
operate in a vacuum in that it is often conscious of corresponding
events in society that might have a bearing on the ways in which
legal strategies will be perceived and whether or not they will be
supported at a particular point in time. This Part discusses each of
these characteristics, in turn.
A. Incremental, Iterative Advocacy
Probably the main common feature of these three examples of
creative lawyering is that each involved incremental and iterative
steps. For the end of slavery, although the factions within Lincoln’s
fragile coalition may have disagreed about what the North’s goals
should be, the smaller steps taken to address the issue of escaped
slaves finding themselves among Union troops helped lay the
groundwork for what ultimately became the Emancipation
Proclamation and, at the conclusion of the war, ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment during Reconstruction. Lincoln did not
announce an end to slavery at the outset of the war. If he had done so,
he might have faced the prospect of the border states that had both
remained slave holding but also stayed in the Union deciding to
secede or at least not supporting the war effort. Similarly,
conservatives in the North might have aligned themselves behind the
war effort for the purpose of preserving the Union but might not have
embraced such an effort if they perceived it as primarily a campaign
to end slavery. The incremental steps taken by Union generals like
Frémont and, more effectively, the attorney and fortress commander,
General Butler, helped lay the groundwork for the Emancipation
Proclamation, through which Lincoln was able to satisfy different
portions of his fragile coalition. This incremental, iterative strategy
shows that doing nothing about slavery was unacceptable to the
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abolitionists, but Frémont’s strategy went too far for some. In the
end, Butler’s approach seemed to be just right, a balancing of
interests that tied abolition to the war effort. It is possible that this
type of approach, accomplished through experimentation and
iteration, may have helped show Lincoln the way forward by
revealing a strategy that could bind the different fractious portions of
his ruling coalition.
Similarly, the LDF’s iterative, incremental approach also helped to
lay the groundwork for the campaign that ultimately succeeded in
bringing about the victory in Brown v. Board of Education and the
end to Jim Crow in education. These successes helped light a fire
among the activists that helped them bring about changes in public
accommodations, housing, and voting through legislative victories,
the organizing for which had been prompted by the end of separate
but equal. The LDF lawyers in Sweatt and other similar cases, took
on smaller, individual institutions rather than those they eventually
assailed in the collection of cases that led to Brown, which attacked
the broader edifice of Jim Crow. Although these lawyers certainly
challenged Jim Crow directly, cases like Sweatt afforded the judges
an opportunity to slowly chip away at the broader system. By filing
this sort of smaller, probing attack against an institution like a law
school, an institution the judges would understand, they made it
possible to show that a school system would have a hard time
offering separate and equal institutions.
Incrementalism also helps advocates develop different types of
arguments, field test them, explore how well they are received by a
wider audience, and bring back the feedback from those efforts to
further hone those arguments in broader contexts. In many ways, this
iterative, incremental approach is akin to the concept known as
“design thinking,”217 which is sometimes seen as having four main
components: inspiration, synthesis, ideation and experimentation, and

217. See TOM KELLEY & DAVID KELLEY, CREATIVE CONFIDENCE: UNLEASHING THE CREATIVE
POTENTIAL WITHIN US ALL 24–25 (2013).
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implementation.218 The inspiration phase is investigatory. It involves
communicating with those who are most affected by a problem or
issue to work with them to explore potential solutions.219 Once the
inspiration phase is complete (although, in some ways, it is never
really complete), the design thinker moves into the ideation and
experimentation phase, where prototypes are developed and field
tested to assess their effectiveness in terms of addressing the problem
at hand.220 The results of this rapid prototyping help to create a
feedback loop, and the original efforts and tactics are then altered in
response to the data received through the successes and failures of
those prototypes to create new prototypes and run new
experiments.221 After successful prototyping, a finished product or
idea can go mainstream, although the experimentation, iteration,
feedback, and modification are ongoing processes.222 This
design-thinking approach is similar to how Linda Morton describes
legal creative problem solving.223 That process, for her, includes
identification of the problem, understanding it, posing solutions,
choosing solutions, implementing solutions, and engaging in a final
analysis of the chosen solutions.224 Similarly, the ABA’s 1992 report
identifies several technical steps related to problem solving,
including identification of the problem, the generation of solutions to
the problem, developing and implementing a plan of action, and
remaining open to new information and ideas.225
A design-thinking approach to creative problem solving would
seem perfectly suited for social-change advocacy in the legal
context.226 Lawyers can gather the perspectives of their clients to
218. See id. at 22–24; see also TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN 16 (2009) (describing design
thinking); Tim Brown, Design Thinking, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2008, at 88–91 (describing design
thinking).
219. KELLEY & KELLEY, supra note 217, at 22.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 23–24.
222. See id. at 24.
223. Morton, supra note 44, at 376–77.
224. Id.
225. See NARROWING THE GAP, supra note 36, at 141–48.
226. See Tim Brown, Why Social Innovators Need Design Thinking, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.
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understand the problems they are trying to solve and begin to develop
solutions to these problems. Additionally, they can prototype
potential solutions based on that fact-finding process, can launch
prototypes of the solutions into the world to see how they fare, bring
feedback from those efforts to craft more robust solutions, and then
take more dramatic steps based on those iterated prototypes and the
lessons learned from the prototyping process and the feedback loop it
generates.227
B. Interpretive Creativity
We also see in these examples that the creative lawyers seeking
social change engaged in a degree of interpretative creativity, often
reframing the legal issues in new ways or borrowing from their
opponents’ arguments and using those arguments against them.
Menkel-Meadow calls this notion of reframing finding new “entry
points”—a new way of looking at a problem from different
perspectives.228 Of course, many lawyers spend much of their time
interpreting statutes, regulations, contracts, and behavior in light of
all three, but social-change lawyers are often in a more difficult
position than traditional lawyers because their paths to interpretative
success are narrower. They are trying to change the status quo and
alter the legal infrastructure that governs behavior within that status
quo. Common interpretations of the scope and contours of that
infrastructure gain some interpretive force because of the widely
(Nov.
15,
2011),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/why_social_innovators_need_design_thinking
[https://perma.cc/TL6W-4DXH]; see also Paul Brest et al., Problem Solving, Human-Centered Design,
and
Strategic
Processes,
STAN.
CTR.
ON
PHILANTHROPY
&
CIV.
SOC’Y,
http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Download-the-full-article-here.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3KC-CA8W] (last updated Oct. 19, 2015) (discussing the intersection of problem
solving and design thinking).
227. See Margaret Hagan, Design Thinking and Law: A Perfect Match, L. PRAC. TODAY (Jan. 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_practice_today_home/lptarchives/2014/january14/design-thinking-and-law.html [https://perma.cc/55VK-LHUT] (exploring the
ways in which lawyers can incorporate design thinking into their practice); see also Tim Brown &
Jocelyn Wyatt, Design Thinking for Social Innovation, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2010, at
32, 35.
228. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 41, at 123, 139.
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shared and widely accepted understandings of their meaning. Of
course, this forces the social-change lawyer to be more creative in her
interpretive efforts and can leave her with little choice but to attempt
to seize upon her opponents’ arguments, embrace them, and bend
them to support the social-change lawyer’s position.229
This is often apparent in many efforts by lawyers to advance social
change. They may have little support for their own positions, so they
turn to the positions of their opponents to show the hypocrisy of them
or the fact that they are based on weak legal force themselves.230 This
is often an important asset for the social-change advocate fighting
long odds. Malcolm Gladwell, in his work David and Goliath:
Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants, points out that our
perception of power asymmetries are often wrong.231 The very
qualities that may appear to give strength to a dominant individual or
entity are often a source of great weakness.232 The Biblical Goliath
was weighted down by his bulk and heavy armor.233 Turkish
fortifications were easily overrun by Lawrence of Arabia’s nimble
Bedouin cavalry.234 For the social-change lawyer, when the
arguments of her adversary, that might have enjoyed support from
what might have been seen as common-sense arguments, are held up
to rigorous analysis, they often collapse under their own weight.
In the decades leading up to the decision in Obergefell, advocates
for the rights of the LGBTQ community won victories in the
Supreme Court showing that a state constitutional amendment in
Colorado stripping local communities of the ability to pass pro-

229. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and the
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). Reva Siegel’s
research into the demise of the Equal Rights Amendment shows how opponents of the amendment were
able to seize upon some of the arguments of the proponents of the amendment, take those arguments to
what those opponents portrayed as their logical extremeness, and help defeat its passage. See id. at
1385–87.
230. See id. at 1364.
231. MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND THE ART OF
BATTLING GIANTS 12–15 (2013).
232. Id. at 6.
233. Id. at 11.
234. See id. at 22.
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LGQBTQ rights ordinances, and laws against sodomy, were based on
little more than the moral preferences of legislators that could not
withstand careful scrutiny.235 Similarly, in the state courts of New
York, a legal definition of family that appeared based on little more
than traditional notions, with no basis in law, failed to recognize the
many ways in which families form and their members recognize
themselves as such.236 The arguments supporting the opponents’
position might have been, at one time, consistent with the common
sensibilities of some portion of the population and might have, at one
time, seemed inevitable and subject to little criticism. When analyzed
for their sources and their logic, however, these arguments proved
insufficient to support discriminatory treatment through the force of
law.
At the same time, if the force of the common-sense support for the
opponent’s position is too strong to overcome a direct attack, the
social-change lawyer often uses her opponents’ own arguments
against them. We saw this in Butler’s controversial cooption of
Southern arguments about property and secession to justify his
refusal to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. Similarly, although the
LDF challenged segregation directly in Sweatt, they also tried
another line of argument: that even accepting separate but equal as
the law of the land, the separate law school for African Americans
was not, in fact, equal by any measure.237 Thus, forcing their
opponents to defend their own position, these positions became
untenable on the facts.
Artist Pablo Picasso is sometimes quoted as having said that “good
artists copy, great artists steal.”238 Perhaps the best, most creative
235. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (finding Texas anti-sodomy statute advanced
no legitimate state interest); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996) (finding Colorado state law that
prohibited local governments from passing LGBTQ protections was based on discriminatory animus and
could not survive rational basis scrutiny).
236. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49, 51–53 (N.Y. 1989) (rejecting narrow and formalistic
definition of family in housing regulations in favor of a functional, realistic approach). For a discussion
of the Braschi case, see CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS
LAWSUITS THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION 51–53 (2010).
237. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–34 (1950).
238. WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 73 (2009).
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social-change lawyers also steal—they just steal from their
opponents.
C. Interdisciplinary Approaches
Another common feature of the social-change efforts highlighted
here is that the lawyers in at least two of the three examples, the LDF
lawyers and the marriage-equality advocates, explicitly incorporated
interdisciplinary approaches in their advocacy.239 Thurgood Marshall
brought together sociologists, historians, political scientists,
educators, and anthropologists while planning the anti-segregation
strategy.240 The Sweatt trial, like those that would lead to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, included expert testimony from
another discipline. In fact, anthropologist Robert Redfield, chairman
of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago,
embodied interdisciplinarity: he held a doctorate in anthropology, as
well as a law degree.241 Redfield testified about the lack of
differences in the educational capacity of African Americans as
compared to whites, as well as the dangers of segregation in
education, particularly as the dangers related to the price that society
pays for the distrust that segregation creates among the population.242
In Brown, Thurgood Marshall and the legal team used the research
and testimony of psychiatrist Frederic Wertham and sociologist
Kenneth B. Clark to show the harmful effects of segregation on
African-American children.243
239. See supra Part II. At the same time, arguments supporting the abolitionist cause did not come
just from lawyers, as prominent journalists, businessmen, and religious officials were leaders in the
Abolitionist Movement. See, e.g., RICHARD S. NEWMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
ABOLITIONISM: FIGHTING SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 4–39 (2002) (describing leadership in the
Pennsylvania Abolition Society in the early 19th century as including lawyers, businessmen, and
preachers).
240. LISA ALDRED ET AL., THURGOOD MARSHALL 80 (1993); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 209 (1998).
241. KLUGER, supra note 171, at 331.
242. Id. at 263.
243. Anders Walker, Blackboard Jungle: Delinquency, Desegregation, and the Cultural Politics of
Brown, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1921–22 (citation omitted) (describing the use of experts in the
Brown litigation).
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In the marriage equality litigation, lawyer’s utilized expert
witnesses in the trial courts to show the complete lack of evidence in
support of the opponents’ positions—that marriage could not be open
to same-sex couples because children did not fare well when reared
in families headed by parents of the same sex.244 In addition, in the
wake of the failure to defeat Proposition 8, advocates enlisted the
support of researchers in surveying and conducting focus groups to
understand the failure of the campaign’s messaging strategies.245
In many ways, the social-change lawyer’s use of interdisciplinary
strategies builds on the iterative and interpretative approaches
described above in that it helps to reframe arguments and tests other
theories against perceived wisdom and common understandings of
the law and society that may need to change to bring about wider
social change. These interdisciplinary approaches are not new, as
Louis Brandeis, then a practicing lawyer in the early 20th century,
used social science to support his legal claims.246 By incorporating
disciplines other than law, social-change advocates widen their own
lenses when they view a problem and begin to see legal issues in a
different light, which then helps them frame their arguments and
present new theories and new ways of looking at the world to judges,
juries, policymakers, legislators, and the general public. In turn, these
theories, informed by interdisciplinary views, might find an audience
more receptive to these arguments because they help that audience
see the law in different ways, undermining traditional understandings
and interpretations of the law and social relations. Those new
understandings and interpretations can lead to the social change that
lawyers and those whom she serves may seek to bring about.

244. FRANK, supra note 49, at 113–14 (discussing dueling expert witnesses regarding same-sexcouple parenting).
245. Ball, supra note 49 (describing effort to assess campaign’s failure to prevent passage of
Proposition 8 in California in 2008).
246. Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 118, 120
(Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989).
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D. Interest Convergence
President Lincoln and the lawyers for the Civil Rights Movement
knew not only that they could build a coalition to achieve their
social-change goals but that they had to do so, and they both crafted
these coalitions around the interests that different members and
groups shared.247 This convergence of interests helped build and
sustain critical coalitions necessary to support and advance the
social-change movement that the leaders and their lawyers wanted to
bring about. Derrick Bell first identified the notion that interest
convergence could justify changes to our collective understanding of
constitutional law.248 Bell first articulated his Interest-Convergence
Theory in response to Herbert Wechsler’s argument critiquing the
Court’s decision in Brown.249 Weschler argued that Brown was not
supportable by what he called “neutral principles”: when a court
“reach[es] judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved.”250 Wechsler argued that
promoting the freedom of association of blacks could not undermine
the freedom of association of whites.251
Countering Weschler, Bell asserted that the shared interests
between the black community and a large proportion of the white
community justified the decision in Brown.252 For Bell, the interests
of blacks (and others) in seeking an end to segregation aligned with
247. See supra Part II.
248. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
249. Id. at 518.
250. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15
(1959).
251. Id. at 34. As Weschler argued:
[I]f the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association
upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant. Is this not the heart of the issue involved,
a conflict in human claims of high dimension, not unlike many others that involve the highest
freedoms—conflicts that Professor Sutherland has recently described. Given a situation where
the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who
wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for
holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?
Id. (footnote omitted).
252. Bell, Jr., supra note 248, at 523.
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national white elites who were concerned with the United States’s
standing in the world, particularly as it sought to maintain its
influence in post-colonial nations where the Soviet Union was using
the Jim Crow system as a wedge between the United States and
potential allies.253 Mary Dudziak’s archival research lends ample
support for Bell’s explanation of the forces that aligned to bring
about the unanimous decision in Brown.254
Bell used the Interest-Convergence Theory to explain and justify
the Court’s decision in Brown.255 Some have taken this theory a step
further, as a way to not just understand but also to promote social
change generally; when one wants to advance social change, one
should look for an alignment of interests among different factions
and communities and seek out ways to build coalitions around the
aligned interests.256 However, the theory itself is not above critique,
and some argue that it is flawed in that it appears to discount the
agency of advocates in spurring social change, suggesting that one
needs to wait for interests to converge to bring about social
253. Id. at 524–25.
254. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 118–19
(1988). Dudziak’s review concluded the following:
The Truman Administration recognized and responded to this threat, marshalling evidence
in its amicus briefs on the foreign policy implications of the desegregation cases. The
Eisenhower Administration took advantage of the denouement, prominently using Brown in
its propaganda efforts. Although American racism would continue to pose foreign policy
difficulties from time to time, and the Soviet Union would continue to use it as a
propaganda theme, Brown helped to undercut the more powerful anti-American arguments.
Brown laundered the principles of democracy in the eyes of the world. The decision
announced that racial segregation and American constitutional rights were inconsistent with
each other. After Brown, the State Department could blame racism on the Klan and the
crazies. They could argue that the American Constitution provided for effective social
change. And, most importantly, they could point to the Brown decision as evidence that
racism was at odds with the principles of American democracy. This foreign policy angle,
this Cold War imperative, was one of the critical factors driving the federal government’s
postwar civil rights efforts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
255. See generally Bell, Jr., supra note 248.
256. For a collection of scholarship applying Interest-Convergence Theory to other contexts, see
Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 154–55 nn.25–28
(2011). For an example of scholarship considering Interest-Convergence Theory as a way to spur social
change, see generally David A. Singleton, Interest Convergence and the Education of African-American
Boys in Cincinnati: Motivating Suburban Whites to Embrace Interdistrict Education Reform, 34 N. KY.
L. REV. 663 (2007).
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change.257 But lawyers who support efforts to bring about social
change can turn to the Interest-Convergence Theory as an organizing
principle and guide to work with clients and partners to be the agents
of that change.
Although Bell identified the convergence of interests that were at
the center of the Civil Rights Movement’s advocacy, this idea
appears in the two other examples described above.258 First, Lincoln
tied ending slavery to preserving the union. To hold his coalition
together, Lincoln knew that he needed to address the slavery question
and seek to bring about its end. However, Lincoln could only go so
far with his Emancipation Proclamation, however, and slavery was
not abolished in the border states that both maintained slaveholding
yet remained loyal to the Union. For those who saw victory on the
battlefield as essential to preserving the Union, freeing the slaves in
Confederate states and territories occupied by Union forces increased
the number of eligible males available to serve as troops in the Union
army. The North’s martial strategy, particularly in the latter years of
the conflict, was to field much larger armies, attack Southern forces
at as many points as possible to test their capacity, and strike at
critical transportation and supply hubs.259 Each aspect of this strategy
needed as many troops as possible, and Lincoln knew that he could
increase recruitment by making former slaves available to join the
257. Driver, supra note 256, at 175. Justin Driver argues that Interest-Convergence Theory has its
flaws because it discounts the role of the agency of the actors who seek to promote social change:
The interest-convergence thesis accords an almost complete absence of agency to two
groups of actors who exercise a great deal of control regarding the advancement of black
interests: the black citizenry and the white judiciary. By implicitly encouraging black
citizens to await the magical moment when their interests converge with the white
majority, the interest-convergence thesis sharply discounts the capacity of black people to
participate in their own uplift. Conversely, by reducing white judges to mere
functionaries who do the bidding of the white establishment, the interest-convergence
thesis simultaneously diminishes the culpability of white judges who exercise their
authority to maintain the existing racial hierarchy and denies the credit owed to white
members of the judiciary who challenge that hierarchy.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a response to Driver, see Kevin Terry, Community Dreams and Nightmares:
Arizona, Ethnic Studies, and the Continued Relevance of Derrick Bell’s Interest-Convergence Thesis, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1483, 1494–95 (2013).
258. See supra Part II.
259. MCPHERSON, supra note 135, at 721–22.
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army to carry out these strategic goals. The Emancipation
Proclamation ultimately satisfied his coalition’s goals by tying the
abolition of slavery to preserving the Union.
For the marriage-equality advocates within the LGBTQ
movement, there was not always support for the effort to promote
same-sex marriage rights. As Nathaniel Frank recounts in his work
Awakening: How Gays and Lesbians Brought Marriage Equality to
America,260 members of the more radical elements of the LGBTQ
movement did not support the effort to recognize same-sex marriage
initially, but different strains of the movement would ultimately
coalesced around the idea of marriage equality as a way to
accomplish broader protections for the community, gain respect,
counter discrimination, and attain cultural acceptance of LGBTQ
members and relationships. 261 This sort of interest convergence also
occurred outside the movement itself. After President Obama
signaled his support for marriage equality, the NAACP announced its
own support for the effort, which represented a shift for the AfricanAmerican community after the results of the Proposition 8 vote in
California showed communities of color narrowly supporting the
ban.262 The NAACP identified a robust interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause that was consistent with what marriage-equality
advocates sought given their own interests and views on the
applicable constitutional protections.263
In each of these situations, Bell’s Interest-Convergence approach
seems to represent an aspect of the lawyers’ strategies: keep fragile

260. See FRANK, supra note 49.
261. See id. at 59–76 (describing evolution of LGBTQ rights activism around AIDS, reform of antisodomy laws, and adoption that brought different strands of that advocacy together in the form of
support for marriage equality).
262. Peter Wallsten & Scott Wilson, Obama Endorses Gay Marriage, Says Same-Sex Couples Should
Have
Right
to
Wed,
WASH.
POST
(May
9,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/05/09/gIQAivsWDU_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_te
rm=.1be0969bcbf6 [https://perma.cc/J8EG-PSHA].
263. Peter Wallsten, NAACP Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (May 19, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/election-2012/post/naacp-endorses-same-sexmarriage/2012/05/19/gIQA5SFSbU_blog.html?utm_term=.14d28dca5985
[https://perma.cc/X9PYB3SP].
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coalitions together and bring new groups into the coalition through
the thoughtful curation of shared interests.
E. Interdependence
Similarly, the legal advocates in each of these situations did not
advocate in a vacuum and were always conscious of events and
trends in culture and society generally. Lincoln waited for a victory
on the battlefield before he released the Emancipation Proclamation.
A deeply religious man, Lincoln is sometimes described as waiting
for a victory because he sought a spiritual sign that his cause was
just.264 He and his cabinet advisors were also keenly aware that
releasing the Proclamation when the North was losing the war would
be seen as an act of desperation.265 Lincoln’s willingness to create a
new legal approach toward slaves that had escaped from lands
controlled by Confederate forces was in some ways beholden to the
larger forces at play as he considered the Proclamation’s release.
Moreover, Lincoln struck a delicate balance in the manner and timing
of the issuance of the proclamation, particularly as it related to both
enhancing the northern forces’ capacity to recruit more able-bodied
soldiers as well as preserving the slaveholding status of loyal border
states.
With the lawyers supporting the Civil Rights Movement, they
were keenly aware of the predicament in which national leaders
found themselves on the geopolitical stage. Lawyers exploited the
fact that the standing of the United States with developing nations
while the country was engaged in competition with Soviet Bloc
countries for global influence.266 Throughout the course of the Civil
Rights Movement’s struggle in the courts, and while the movement
went from the courts to the streets and the halls of Congress in the
1960s, the national security and foreign policy components of the
264. WITT, supra note 139, at 214–15.
265. Id. at 214.
266. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8), 1952 WL 82045 (arguing that Jim Crow frustrated and undermined foreign
diplomacy).
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civil rights strategy played a role in the movement’s advocacy to
bring about legislative changes to private accommodations, housing,
and voting rights.267 This aspect of the strategy was not lost on
national leaders. In a conversation with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
President Lyndon B. Johnson praised his legislative efforts in
promoting civil rights, referencing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
follows: “I think the greatest achievement in foreign policy [of the
Johnson administration] . . . was the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.”268
Progressive advocates have also shifted their focus away from the
federal courts in many instances as a reaction to the ways in which
the federal judiciary has become more conservative because the
Reagan Administration began to use the judicial appointment power
to select more overtly partisan judges.269 This practice continued
through the presidency of George W. Bush and has proceeded apace
during the Trump Administration.270 As a part of this campaign, at
least originally, officials in the Reagan Administration sought to
curtail the type of social-change litigation, like Brown, that became
known as public law litigation.271 This effort was designed to protect
not only federal actors from judicial oversight but also state- and
local-government allies of the Administration from judicial
intervention in their practices.272 In what Derrick Bell might have
called an “interest convergence,” probusiness forces also advocated

267. Conversation with MARTIN LUTHER KING and OFFICE SECRETARY, January 15, 1965,
MILLER CTR. PUB. AFFS., http://millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings/lbj-wh6501.04-6736
[https://perma.cc/6BAL-LH7C].
268. Id.
269. Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., NY TIMES (Nov. 11,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appeals-courts-conservatives.
html [https://perma.cc/TC5Y-4MRS].
270. Id.
271. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976).
272. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1543, 1552 (2014) (describing how the first issue the Reagan Administration attempted to
address in terms of litigation reform was limiting access to courts to pursue federal rights, not torts that
business interests might seek to limit).
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for relief from litigation.273 First, members of the judiciary, for
political reasons or out of a desire to control their own dockets,
sought mechanisms for reining in many different types of litigation,
including public law and social-change litigation.274 Indeed, in
decisions such as Bell Atlantic v. Twombly275 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,276
the Supreme Court altered the rules of pleading to require litigants to
set forth their claims and defenses with such specificity that they
might render their claims plausible in the eyes of the judge.277
Second, courts have made the dispositive remedy of summary
judgment more readily available by interpreting Rule 56 and other
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more favorably for
moving parties so that they might avoid a trial on the merits.278 Third,
courts have interpreted fee-shifting statutes more narrowly than in the
past, making contingency-fee cases less attractive to the private
bar.279 Fourth, courts have taken a more expansive view of
273. Bell, Jr., supra note 248, at 523. In recent years, according to a compelling empirical study,
litigants looking for a judiciary more favorable to business interests found it, at least in the Supreme
Court. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1471–
72 (2013) (finding more pro-business Justices in the Roberts Court than in previous eras).
274. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1839, 1859–67 (2014) (describing growth of civil caseloads and judicial response thereto);
see also Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1114 (2006) (describing
“‘hostility’ to ‘litigation’” as a driving force behind procedural jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court).
Siegel’s analysis of the decisions of the Rehnquist Court led him to conclude as follows: “The common
thread throughout is doubt in the efficacy of a lawsuit as a mechanism for resolving the problem at hand,
coupled perhaps with a disproportionate animosity towards those who believe otherwise.” Id. at 1115;
see also Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 823–40 (2011) (raising
prospect that expanded access to the courts can provoke a judicial backlash out of concerns over
increased court dockets).
275. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
276. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
277. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 17–23 (2010) (describing the Twombly and Iqbal decisions
and their impact on pleading requirements in civil cases in the federal courts).
278. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 1016–21 (2003) (noting “shifting judicial attitude” in favor of more readily granting summary
judgment).
279. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 610 (2001); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1087, 1133
(2007) (describing Buckhannon as part of an “ominous shift of power away from private enforcement of
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government immunity for both state and local officials.280 In
addition, courts have raised the standard for certifying expert
witnesses,281 made class actions more difficult to commence and
sustain,282 recognized the enforceability of arbitration clauses,283 and
refused to engage in oversight of institutions that are the subject of
reform litigation.284 Owen Fiss has described these and other trends
away from public law litigation as a “counterrevolution” in the
courts.285 As a result, in many instances progressive lawyers have had
to explore tactics for promoting progressive social-change objectives
other than through the filing of high-profile impact litigation in the
federal courts.
In many ways, the fact that the federal courts have become more
hostile to public-law litigation in general and, by extension, socialchange litigation in particular has led to the type of pluralistic
approaches that many social-change lawyers are adopting. These
lawyers seek out new avenues for redress and advocacy apart from
looking solely to the federal courts as the venue for and the target of
advocacy.286 Although litigation is a common tactic used by
progressive lawyers, many have turned to state courts as the forum in

rights toward government power both to resist civil rights mandates and to control the enforcement of
these rights”).
280. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317, 322–26 (2012)
(describing the trend toward recognizing government immunity in different settings).
281. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (setting standard for
recognition of expert witness); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 517, 554–56 (2010) (describing the impact of Daubert on civil rights litigation).
282. For a description of these trends, see Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T
v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011).
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1466–
68 (2013) (describing judicial endorsement of institutional defendants’ efforts to terminate consent
decrees in public law litigation); Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 187 (2017) (noting that institutional reform litigation “has lost much
of the prominence and momentum it had during its initial phases”).
285. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1979); see also Siegel, supra note 274, at 1114 (describing the Rehnquist Court’s “litigation
hostility” as a “powerful force shaping the Court’s basal understanding of its institutional project”).
286. See supra Part I.C.
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which to litigate claims based on state constitutions and state law.287
But litigation alone is not the only tactic used by lawyers working for
social change. The lawyers also engaged in legislative advocacy,288
policy change,289 community development efforts through the
provision of transactional legal services,290 and supporting grassroots
organizing.291
Because the Brown litigation preceded this conservative backlash
in the courts, and some would argue it was the reason for backlash,292
we must turn to the tactics of the marriage equality movement to
assess whether or not turning away from federal courts is a part of
that pluralistic, tactical approach embedded in a realpolitik that
recognizes these wider trends in society in general and their
ramifications on the federal judiciary. As we saw with Lincoln in the
Battle of Antietam and civil rights advocates’ recognition of the role
that foreign policy interests could play in applying pressure on the
federal government to support their cause, marriage-equality
advocates waited until the point where the wider aims could be
served by litigating in federal court despite the obstacles described
above. These advocates chose to litigate in state courts under state
constitutional provisions until the opportunity presented itself to
bring the broader challenge to prohibitions on same-sex marriage
under the United States Constitution. At the same time, the landmark

287. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J. 37 (2012),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/
[https://perma.cc/AZP5FUF2] (describing role of state actors and embrace of state fora for the pursuit of progressive policy
goals).
288. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 991 (describing value and role of legislative advocacy in social-change lawyering).
289. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Legal Services Support Centers and Rebellious Advocacy: A Case Study
of the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 267–68 (2008) (describing,
among other things, policy work of social-change organization).
290. See Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a CED Empowerment
Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory Decision-Making and
Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 255–56 (2010) (offering case study of
transactional, progressive lawyering).
291. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 443, 460 (2001) (providing overview of progressive lawyering and community organizing).
292. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 55, at xviii–xix.
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cases of the LGBTQ rights advocacyLawrence v. Texas,293 United
States v. Windsor,294 and Obergefell v. Hodges295were all filed in
federal court and made their way to the Supreme Court of the United
States. For each of these cases, a federal constitutional issue was at
the heart of the litigation, and even if the case had begun in state
court, the Supreme Court would have been the ultimate arbiter of the
claims. The litigants might have had a choice of where they might
file the case, but there was no doubt about where the cases would
ultimately end up. At the same time, with the painstaking,
incremental work of marriage-equality advocacy, that work, seeking
out strategic victories where they could find them to create a critical
mass of victories at the state level, was, for the most part, carried out
in state courts. From Hawaii to Massachusetts and Vermont, the
marriage-equality advocates, fearing resistance at the Supreme Court
and the fact that the federal judiciary might not be ready to rule in
their favor, filed lawsuits based mostly on state constitutional
grounds.296 Thus, these advocates were not insensitive to the trends in
the courts and wider society and crafted strategies that were mindful
of those trends when they decided the legal steps to advance the
cause of marriage equality.297
The legal advocacy directed at social change described here seems
to indicate that these highlighted efforts shared several common
themes. These efforts were often incremental in nature. They
required creativity in terms of the ways in which the advocates
viewed the law. They often involved interdisciplinary approaches.
The advocates sought out opportunities to build coalitions through
finding common ground—referred to here as interest convergence—
with likely and unlikely partners. And they viewed their work in the
context of what was happening in the world outside of their
293. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
294. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
295. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584 (2015).
296. John F. Kowal, The Improbable Victory of Marriage Equality, Brennan Center for Justice (Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/improbable-victory-marriage-equality
[https://perma.cc/4K37-FA7Z].
297. See FRANK, supra note 49, at 70 (describing LQBTQ rights advocacy in state courts).
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advocacy, assessing their work in light of the broader social context
and making tactical decisions based on that context. The previous
Part identified the challenges that lawyers working for social change
face and the extent to which those challenges require creativity. The
next and concluding Part attempts to assess the extent to which these
components of the three efforts to bring about social change
highlighted above might offer ways for social-change lawyers to
overcome these challenges through creativity.
IV. Creativity and the Social-Change Lawyer
Part II set forth some of the challenges that lawyers must face
when they try to bring about social change. We hope that these
lawyers seek to make the lives of their clients—however they
identify their clients—better through efforts to create lasting social
change that is meaningful to those clients. Social-change work is
challenging, however, precisely because it involves change: change
to power relations, change to the status quo, and change in the
policies that impact clients. Those challenges include that, first, they
must alter the existing laws and policies—they cannot simply work
within existing legal frameworks using tried-and-true, formulaic, and
time-tested solutions to straightforward problems.
Second, they must involve their clients and the communities they
serve in the critical strategic decisions that the lawyers make as they
chart a course for the advocacy out of fear that the legal strategy and
the process by which it is developed may further marginalize the
clients. There is always a risk that lawyer-centric strategies may
weaken and distract from community efforts to achieve selfdetermination and a more democratic society. Relying on elites like
members of the legal profession to engage in social engineering that
is not grounded in the lives and lived experiences of the clients that
those lawyers ostensibly serve might actually perpetuate
misunderstanding and marginalization. Moreover it would offer those
communities victories that they have not sought and changes that are
not necessarily beneficial to them, further solidifying their outsider
status. Lawyers for social change must also strive to avoid a backlash
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against their clients and the communities they represent, ensuring the
ultimate goals of the representation are not undermined by short-term
victories. Third, they must navigate between clients’ demands and
donors’ preferences and desires, finding ways to fit their work within
the constraints of existing funding sources or locate new financial
support for work not supported by existing funding streams. Fourth,
social-change lawyers must balance the need to meet ongoing and
direct needs of individual clients against the long-term law-reform
effortsthose that build the political power that is likely to bring
about a reordering of social relations that are more just. Fifthand
related to the fourth challengesocial-change lawyers must pursue
complex goals and must do so on behalf of clients that are not always
easily identified. Sixth, the social-change lawyer might have to
choose among a wider array of tactics than the traditional lawyer
simply because she may be foreclosed from using tactics commonly
used in most lawyering work. This limitation on tactics means that
the lawyer must look for other means of achieving client goals.
The main point of this Article is that these challenges that the
lawyer faces when trying to serve her clients in advancing social
change create complexities for the lawyer that go beyond those that
the traditional lawyer faces when serving her client. These
complexities require creativity to address them and to serve the client
with zeal to achieve the social change that will benefit that client. To
what extent do the common features of the examples of successful
social-change lawyering that I have provided here help chart a course
for the social-change lawyer? Do the common characteristics of these
examples of social-change lawyering offer techniques and tactics for
bringing creativity to this work?
Although iterative, incremental approaches help advocates hone
better ideas, they also advance the cause of social change in a more
just and democratic way by incorporating clients in the problemsolving effort. Incremental approaches can help to satisfy them, at
least partially, on the way toward bringing about the larger strategic
measures that might ultimately lead to the broader social change that
the lawyer seeks. Of course, some clients might express frustration
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for the conservative nature of an incremental approach, but
incrementalism might turn out to serve the long -term goals of the
client and the client’s community better. Moreover, incremental,
iterative approaches should include clients in the inspiration and
experimentation phases by consulting with them as the lawyers and
clients together determine the proper course of action. The lawyer
should engage those clients in developing the experimental
arguments that the lawyer may use, helping to “crowdsource” the
ideas that the lawyer will promote—likely leading to better ideas—
but also investing the clients in the process itself, giving them
confidence that the lawyer is taking the client’s problem seriously.298
In addition, the lawyer can balance the need for broader change with
addressing the client’s immediate needs through incremental
measures that are designed to test ideas that can build toward more
wide-ranging impacts in a way that helps alleviate the direct and
immediate legal needs of the client. In this way, the lawyer can use
incrementalism as a way to thread the needle between broader social
change and the urgent needs of the client while she is waiting for that
broader change to transpire.
The “test case” model is a perfect example of this. A lawyer has a
client with facts that serve to exemplify the broader problem other
clients and communities face, but the lawyer files a narrow case on
that client’s behalf in the hope of testing out her arguments on the
courts, hopefully finding ones that will address the client’s immediate
needs while also garnering feedback about what arguments may
resonate with the courts should a larger, more wide-ranging action
follow.299
Incrementalism might also serve as an effective antidote to
potential backlashthe reversal of victories or an erosion of

298. On the value of crowdsourcing, see generally, JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
(2005). As Tom Tyler’s research shows, engagement with a legal process helps people feel more
connected to it and more trusting of the outcomes that come as a result. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice:
Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000).
299. Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1995)
(describing and evaluating the test-case model of progressive lawyering).
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rightswhich might come as opponents are energized by their own
losses to harness their own collective energy and will take action to
counteract the strides made by the forces of social change. Taking
small steps allows the community to begin to see what social change
might look like, experience it, realize that the change is itself not all
that different from the status quo, and come to accept that change a
small amount at a time. As more people begin to accept the
changeeven if at a slow paceit gives opponents a smaller base of
support when they begin to mount their challenges to the change.
Another aspect of the creative social-change lawyering described
in Part II is that each of the lawyers engaged in an exercise so critical
to lawyering generally and social-change lawyering in particular:
they used their interpretive powers to reframe issues, often seizing on
the weaknesses of their opponents’ positions and exploiting them.
For the social-change lawyer, her primary role in the context of
efforts to bring about change is to serve as the translator of legal
concepts in ways that can support the social change that she and her
clients seek. What makes this aspect of social-change lawyering so
creative is that the lawyer often must fit together received wisdom
and the controlling legal narratives of dominant interpretations of the
law that help to maintain and preserve the status quo.300 Dominant
interpretations often leave little room for outsider perspectives on the
law to convince decision makers of the interpretation that the socialchange lawyer seeks. This is precisely why social-change lawyers
often must attempt a reassessment of the legal, sociological, ethical,
moral, and factual bases and underpinnings of their opponents’
arguments. When faced with little room to maneuver and few options
to make the affirmative case on their clients’ behalf, the creative
lawyer can seek to encourage a reassessment of the support of the
opponents’ position. And to carry out this reassessment, the lawyer

300. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411, 2438 (1989) (citation omitted).
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deploys the tools of creativity described earlier, particularly
reframing.301
But does this type of reframing and reimagining help to overcome
some of the challenges that the social-change lawyer must overcome
in pursuing change? One of the main uses of this type of reframing is
that it can often reaffirm the dignity of the community on whose
behalf the lawyer is advocating. In the marriage-equality litigation,
reframing the issues helped to promote the interests of the LGBTQ
community by undermining the arguments of the marriage-equality
opponents.302 In so doing, advocates destroyed the factual
justifications for opposing marriage equality and helped fight the
stigma that those justifications created. When marriage-equality
opponents said that heterosexual marriage needed the endorsement of
the state to ensure procreation, marriage-equality advocates argued
that there were plenty of heterosexual couples who could not
procreate—should the state not recognize their marriages then?303
When opponents argued that children needed heterosexual couples to
raise them, marriage-equality advocates presented overwhelming
support for the proposition that children raised in same-sex
households fared the same as those in households headed by
heterosexual couples.304 Instead of further marginalizing and
oppressing their client communities, the reframing of the issues
helped reaffirm the dignity of their LGBTQ clients and their families.
Through creative reframing, the lawyers were able to overcome

301. Reframing should not be confused with “framing,” which in social science literature describes a
process by which an individual or community may see the world to make sense of it. See ERVING
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974). For one example of the role of political framing itself in
progressive lawyering, see Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L. J. 804, 804 (2008).
302. Andrea Anastasi, Reframing the Fight for LGBT Equality as a First Amendment Issue, WHYY
(May 5, 2015), https://whyy.org/articles/reframing-the-fight-for-lgbt-equality-as-a-first-amendmentissue [https://perma.cc/MF9J-TCZF].
303. FRANK, supra note 49, at 56–57.
304. What does the Scholarly Research say About the Well-Being of Children with Gay or Lesbian
Parents?, WHAT WE KNOW (Dec. 2017) https://whatweknow.inequality.cornell.edu/topics/lgbtequality/what-does-the-scholarly-research-say-about-the-wellbeing-of-children-with-gay-or-lesbianparents [https://perma.cc/C9EE-TG8E].
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obstacles to the social change they sought while also avoiding some
of the deeper pitfalls of social-change lawyering.
Admittedly, this is not always the case. Indeed, the reframing
carried out by Benjamin Butler when he called escaped slaves
contraband did not sit well with abolitionists who thought Butler was
accepting the South’s view of slaves as property too readily, and this
reframing undermined the efforts to recognize the humanity and
dignity of the slaves themselves—the very individuals Butler was
trying to protect and save.305 There is thus sometimes a risk that
accepting the opponents’ position in an effort to undermine it can
have the effect of further marginalizing and demeaning the very
clients that the lawyer seeks to serve. I do not know if anyone ever
asked the escaped slaves who presented themselves on Fort Monroe
in the early days of the war whether or not they approved of Butler’s
tactics. My guess is they preferred freedom, but that is not to say that
every interpretive act carried out by the social-change lawyer will
always advance the client’s interests while also reaffirming the
client’s basic dignity and humanity.306 Thus, although reframing can
offer social-change lawyers an opportunity to advance their legal
position, the process of identifying which arguments to make, how
and when to make them, and to what ends are issues that should
always be addressed in collaboration with the client and the
community that the lawyer serves. That brings us back to the designthinking, or incremental, approach described above. To the extent
that the interpretive strategies deployed by the lawyer are carried out
in collaboration with the client, it is likely to yield better results that
are reaffirming of the client and effective in the course of the
representation.
Similarly, by expanding the tools that the lawyer uses to carry out
these interpretive functions, the lawyer can create more creative
strategies by developing an appreciation for the ways in which the

305. SupraLawyers and the Abolition of Slavery in the United States.
306. See White, supra note 53, at 28–29 (discussing ways in which a lawyer’s interpretation of a
client’s story can undermine the dignity of the client).
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dominant legal interpretation of particular social relations that the
lawyer is challenging cannot hold up when assessed under the
scrutiny of other disciplines. By leaving the realm of law altogether
and seeking out support for one’s position from other disciplines, the
social-change lawyer is able to overcome the opponents’ dominant
positions and undermine them by looking at the problem in different
ways from different perspectives.307 These different perspectives help
to reveal the weaknesses, inconsistencies, and baselessness of the
assumptions that often underpin dominant narratives and
interpretations of the law and social relations. By incorporating
insights from different disciplines in creative ways, the social-change
lawyer identifies flaws in the dominant interpretation of the law and
the extent to which those flaws often find a basis in unsupportable,
stereotypical, and discriminatory animus. By bringing in perspectives
from other disciplines, the lawyer can reveal the narrowness of the
thinking that supports the opponents’ positions and use those
perspectives to advance a richer understanding of the human
experience and further the social-change goals that she seeks.308
One way to further those goals in creative ways is to help the
clients and the communities that the social-change lawyers serve
build power. A critical way in which she helps those communities
build power is through creative-coalition building. Central to
creative-coalition building is the notion that coalitions often form
around shared interests—together with shared ways of viewing the
world—which is sometimes referred to in the social-science literature
as “frame alignment.”309 The ability to identify those shared
307. See Damon Centola, Robb Willer & Michael Macy, The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational
Model of Self-Enforcing Norms, 4 AM. J. SOC. 1009, 1010 (2005) (describing power of different
perspectives to help diminish the spread of false information).
308. In his study of the effective strategies of farmworker organizers in California in the latter half of
the 20th century, Marshall Ganz showed that this type of openness to diverse views can help to improve
organizational effectiveness because it creates networks of information and learning that lead to the
collection of more salient information, which in turn leads to better, more informed, and more effective
tactics and strategies. MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION,
AND STRATEGY IN THE CALIFORNIA FARM WORKER MOVEMENT 19–20 (2009).
309. David A. Snow, et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464 (1986).
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intereststo find opportunities where interests converge and
alignrequires creativity, an ability to sense opportunities for
collaboration, and crafting a campaign’s message in a way that it will
attract supporters from as wide of a section of the populace as
possible. This message crafting requires creativity and a sense of the
needs and interests of different sectors of society. That necessitates a
willingness to seek out, stay attuned to, and listen for opportunities
where one’s clients’ interests will align with that of other individuals
and groups who may serve as potential allies and supporters. In many
ways, the pursuit of potential allies requires the tools of creativity as
wellspecifically, an ability to reframe ideas and see things from
different perspectives. In addition, the social-change lawyer can
begin to identify potential allies and test out new theories that may
bring those allies into the supportive fold by testing out theories
through incremental steps. An example of this was the submission of
an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States military’s service
academies310 in support of the University of Michigan in defense of
the use of racial diversity in admissions decisions in Grutter v.
Bollinger311 and Gratz v. Bollinger.312 In these ways, some of the
components of the social-change lawyering described here can work
together to identify and tap into areas where interests converge.
Finally, when the social-change lawyer takes into account the ways
in which trends in the world beyond the law can affect arguments that
one makes and the success she may have, she is recognizing that
social change is always embedded in a context, and that context often
determines the strategies that one can and should use to advance that
social change. When doing so, the lawyer is also sensitive to the
310. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516) (“Amici are former high-ranking officers and civilian leaders of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps, including former military-academy superintendents, Secretaries of
Defense, and present and former members of the U.S. Senate . . . . Based on decades of experience,
amici have concluded that a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to
command our nation’s racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its
principal mission to provide national security.”).
311. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
312. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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ways in which her legal strategies can play out, how receptive
potential allies will be to them, and the extent to which they might
furtheror undermineefforts to build client power that can
ultimately reorder social relations in a more just way. Taking into
account the ways in which legal strategies might play out in the
community and the broader society also helps the lawyer minimize
the risk of backlash where a solution that might advance a client’s
cause in one area or on one issue can actually undermine further
advances or result in a retrenchment of rights generally, as opposition
forces can use their own defeats as accelerants for actions that
undermine the long-term interests of the communities that the socialchange lawyer serves.313 By incorporating an appreciation for
political, socioeconomic, and cultural trends into the tactical decision
making that the lawyer undertakes in collaboration with her client,
the social-change lawyer can help to advance the interests of the
client, ensure that the advocacy helps to increase and enhance the
ability of that client to achieve self-determination and social justice,
and minimize the risk of backlash against her efforts. Such an
appreciation requires creativity and an openness to accept new
information and incorporate it into one’s strategic decision-making
processes that the social-change lawyer uses in collaboration with the
clients that she serves.
Thus, the social-change lawyer faces challenges beyond those that
the traditional lawyer faces but has the tools at her disposal to address
those challenges with skill and creativity. As the examples of the
creative social-change lawyers highlighted here show, these lawyers
exhibited common strategies for bringing about social change that
revealed the creative ways in which these challenges. By seeking
incremental change, reframing critical legal issues in new ways,
incorporating
interdisciplinary
perspectives,
seeking
out
313. For example, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London a
groundswell of community activism opposed to the decision led many state legislatures to take action to
limit the eminent domain power of state and local governments. For a review of post-Kelo legislation,
see Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance: An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo, 17
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 237, 237–38 (2009).
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opportunities where interests converge, and exhibiting a sensitivity to
emerging trends and the wider social and political context in which
the lawyer’s efforts are taking place, the social-change lawyer can
help overcome some of these challenges in creative and effective
ways.
CONCLUSION
The history of lawyering for social change is long and storied.
However, it is not without its challenges. At the heart of the lawyer’s
work is problem solving. For the lawyer seeking to bring about social
change, the problems that she faces are compounded by the existence
of legal doctrine that is not generally consistent with the client’s
position (hence the need for social change), the risk that advocacy
can undermine the client’s long-term interest, and the fact that
professionally driven and lawyer-centric advocacy can actually
perpetuate the status quo and further oppress the clients that the
lawyer seeks to serve. This Article has used three examples of
lawyers who have advanced social change in an attempt to identify
any common characteristics of their advocacy to understand the ways
in which advocates have used creativity to achieve their social goals
and overcome some of these barriers to problem solving in the socialchange context. Those common characteristics appear to be a
willingness to pursue incremental change, the deft reframing of the
legal issues that can advance or inhibit the lawyer’s work for change,
the incorporation of interdisciplinary perspectives into the work, the
search for opportunities for coalition building through the
identification of where diverse interests converge among individuals
and communities, and an appreciation for the ways in which political
and other trends may impact the lawyer’s social-change efforts. Each
of these components is a reflection of the ways in which these socialchange lawyers incorporated creativity into their work to overcome
and offset some of the risks inherent in social-change lawyering.
Although all lawyers solve problems, the social-change lawyer faces
problems of a different quality and degree because she faces an
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additional challenge: she is generally seeking to change the legal
infrastructure that affects the lives of her clients rather than simply
operating within it. The ability to use creative problem-solving
techniques relevant to social-change lawyering is a critical
competency of the social-change lawyer. This Article has been an
attempt to identify some of those techniques and to recognize their
role in social-change lawyering in the past. It is up to the lawyers of
today and tomorrowthe lawyers working for social changeto
determine the extent to which these techniques may prove useful in
the future or whether or not new and different techniques are needed
to bring about the social change that is clearly needed to create a
more just, fair, and equal society.
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